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“The more things change, the more they remain the same.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
How important is counsel in representing a mentally disordered person
in a court proceeding to determine whether that person can be subjected
to involuntary civil commitment or in a court proceeding to determine
whether psychotropic medication can be administered to a civilly
committed mental patient over that patient’s objection? Michael Perlin,
author of the definitive five volume treatise on mental disability law2
and the foremost authority on the subject, has asserted that the quality of
counsel is “the single most important factor in the disposition of involuntary
civil commitment cases”3 and is “of critical importance in the disposition
of right-to-refuse treatment cases as well.”4
This Article explores how well counsel has performed this function
historically and whether deficiencies in performance have been eliminated
over time. Part II discusses empirical studies of attorney performance in
civil commitment proceedings conducted in the 1960s and 1970s. Those
studies revealed a consistent failure of attorneys to advocate actively for
their mentally disordered clients in those proceedings. Although numerous
commentators have relied upon those studies to denounce attorney
passivity and to urge attorneys to aggressively resist involuntary civil
commitment of their clients, inadequate performance by attorneys
continues to be the rule today, rather than the exception.
Part III discusses the doctrine of informed consent and its applicability
to civilly committed mental patients who wish to refuse treatment with
psychotropic medication. Scholars have asserted, and numerous courts
have ruled, that mentally disordered persons, even mentally disordered
persons who have been involuntarily committed, may, nevertheless, be
competent to rationally evaluate the treatment proposed for their mental
1. ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (1849), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 443 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
Consider also this quotation: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.” GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON (1905–06), quoted in BARTLETT,
supra, at 588.
2. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed.
1998); see also Virginia Aldige Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An
Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 663 (1977) (reporting that
when counsel challenged evidence that the proposed patient’s mental condition met the
criteria for involuntary civil commitment, decisions to civilly commit were significantly
reduced).
3. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 362–63.
4. Id. at 363.
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condition. If they are competent, their informed consent to treatment
should be required, just as it is for any other competent patient.
Although the right of competent mental patients to refuse treatment has
been articulated and accepted—at least theoretically—almost no
attention has been devoted to the adequacy of attorneys who represent
patients in hearings to determine their competency to withhold consent
to treatment. If lawyers do not advocate zealously for their mentally
disordered clients to avoid involuntary civil commitment, one can
assume they are less likely to advocate zealously for their civilly
committed, mentally disordered clients who wish to refuse treatment
prescribed by their doctors that may improve their mental condition
sufficiently to allow them to be released.
Part IV discusses civil commitment in California, focusing on mental
health conservatorhips that are used—almost exclusively—to achieve
long-term civil commitment of mentally disordered individuals. In addition
to permitting the conservator to involuntarily confine the conservatee in
a mental hospital, the law also allows the conservator to impose
involuntary treatment on the conservatee—even though the conservatee
has not been adjudicated incompetent to make treatment decisions.
Part V discusses an empirical study of attorney performance in
representing proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings conducted
in San Diego in 1975, more than thirty years ago. As reported in that
study, the attorneys’ performance was abysmal. Part V also discusses a
California Supreme Court case decided one year after the study was
published.5 In reaching its decision to impose certain stringent due
process safeguards in the conservatorship hearing process, the court
relied in part on the results of this early study.
Part VI reports on a second study of attorney performance in representing
proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings conducted in December
of 2007 and the spring of 2008. This study attempted to replicate the
study conducted more than thirty years earlier. Although there were
changes in the way hearings were conducted and the qualifications of
attorneys who represented proposed conservatees, attorney performance
remained abysmal. As I observed these hearings, I felt that I had entered
a time warp—I was transported back to 1975, observing hearings conducted

5.

Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
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in the earlier study. The words of Yogi Berra came to my mind: “This is
like déjà vu all over again.”6
Part VII concludes the Article by discussing the changes that must
occur in order to improve attorney performance. In 2001, the Montana
Supreme Court appropriately characterized the ineffective assistance of
counsel in civil commitment proceedings as a “systemic failure”7 and
issued practice guidelines to ensure that attorneys perform as vigorous
advocates safeguarding the rights and liberties of their mentally
disordered clients.8 I can only hope that the Montana model will be
emulated nationally, and that it will not take another thirty years for
passive paternalism to be replaced by zealous advocacy.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL FOR MENTALLY DISORDERED
PERSONS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS
In 1966, Fred Cohen reported that attorneys representing prospective
mental patients in civil commitment proceedings performed perfunctorily,
deferring to the judgment of the psychiatrists who recommended
commitment.9 In essence, the attorneys viewed their function as
ceremonial.10 In a study of one day’s activity in Travis County, Texas,
Professor Cohen found that one attorney was appointed to represent the
forty patients at the commitment hearings scheduled for that day, that the
attorney asked no questions of the doctors and offered no evidence to
controvert their recommendations, and that all forty patients were civilly
committed for an indefinite period of time and found to be mentally
incompetent.11 The forty hearings were conducted in a total of seventyfive minutes.12
In 1970, an investigation of the Iowa civil commitment process
revealed that “in the normal case appointed counsel makes no pre-

6. QuoteDB, http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/1304 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
Déjà vu, which is also known as paramnesia, is defined as “the illusion that one has
previously had an experience that is actually new to one.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 372 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d college ed. 1970).
7. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 494 (Mont. 2001).
8. Id. at 497–500.
9. Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 424–25 (1966).
10. Id. at 425.
11. Id. at 427–30. A far more extensive examination of judicial hearings involving
applications for civil commitment, conducted in St. Louis, Missouri, in the 1960s,
revealed that the mentally disordered person was not civilly committed in only two of the
1700 cases studied. George E. Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 540.
12. Cohen, supra note 9, at 430. The attorney was compensated at the rate of ten
dollars per case and thus received four hundred dollars for his “efforts.” Id.
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hearing preparation nor does he meet with his client in advance of the
day of the hearing.”13 The attorneys were “neither aware of nor concerned
about their client’s desires.”14 They viewed their function as simply to
ensure that their client would not be improperly “railroaded” into an
institution by a person motivated by hostility or vindictiveness.15 Once
the lawyer concluded that the client was not being “railroaded,” the
lawyer did not actively defend the client from the state’s exercise of
power to involuntarily commit the patient.16 Although a criminal defense
attorney “is not deterred from his goal of preventing a determination that
his client is criminally responsible . . . [i]n the involuntary hospitalization
area, however, most attorneys accept the proposition that the expert in
mental health is better prepared to determine what is in the best interests
of their client.”17 The authors found that effective decisionmaking power is
allocated “to the medical profession with the legal process and the attorney
assuming a ceremonial function.”18
Three years after this study was published, the Iowa Legislature
enacted comprehensive legislation19 substantially revising the state’s
civil commitment process.20 In direct response to the problem of inadequate
legal representation of proposed patients, the 1975 legislation clarified
that the attorney
is the primary guarantor of the respondent’s procedural and substantive rights. . . .
The attorney’s responsibility, in view of these considerations, is to hold the state
to its burden of proof, and to fully raise all relevant evidence and arguments
bearing on the respondent’s suitability for involuntary treatment. . . . Counsel is
given ample means to serve this role, including continuing rights to notice,
discovery, independent expert evaluation, presentation of evidence, and crossexamination.21

13. Note, Contemporary Studies Project: Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil
Commitment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 895, 914 (1970) [hereinafter Contemporary Studies Project].
14. Id. at 920.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 921.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 922.
19. An Act Relating to Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, ch. 139, 1975 Iowa Acts
350 (codified with subsequent revisions at IOWA CODE ch. 229).
20. See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill
in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation, 61 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1975) (describing, analyzing, and
interpreting the civil commitment legislation enacted in Iowa in 1975).
21. Id. at 365–66.
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Despite this legislative clarification of the attorney’s role, a study of the
Iowa civil commitment process, published four years after the legislation
was enacted, revealed that nearly three-fourths of the hearings continued
to be conducted in a nonadversarial manner.22 Although the decisionmaker
typically relied upon the physician’s report and examination as the main
source of evidence, in over 99% of the cases, the attorney representing
the proposed patient—whether in an adversarial or nonadversarial hearing—
did not request a second medical opinion.23 Cross-examination of the
physician who testified for commitment either did not occur or was “of
doubtful quality.”24 “[W]hen the physician recommends commitment,
the defense attorney often agrees with the finding instead of following
the statute and assembling a defense with the many tools that the statute
provides.”25 The authors of this 1979 study concluded: “At no stage in
the commitment process have the attorneys consistently fulfilled the
duties created by the statute. . . . Instead, the attorneys do little more than
appear at the hearing and draw their fee.”26
In 1974, David Wexler and Stanley Scoville reported similar results in
a study of civil commitment hearings in Arizona’s Maricopa and Pima
Counties.27 Typically, a single attorney was appointed to represent all of
the indigent individuals in civil commitment cases conducted in one
day.28 If the attorney believed the individual met the commitment
criteria, then “[u]nlike a criminal action where an attorney generally
seems untroubled by zealously seeking his client’s acquittal despite a
personal belief in the client’s guilt and dangerous character, attorneys
representing patients in commitment hearings usually do little or nothing
to obtain the client’s release.”29 Even if the attorney, based on a brief
interview with the patient, believes that civil commitment is unwarranted,
the attorney “will usually rely on the psychiatric report more than on his
own intuitive reaction or the unsupported word of his client.”30 In fact,
22. Serena D. Stier & Kurt J. Stoebe, Contemporary Studies Project, Involuntary
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 1284, 1344 (1979).
23. Id. at 1347. Attorney preparation for civil commitment hearings was characterized
as “minimal,” even for adversarial hearings. Id. at 1350.
24. Id. at 1348.
25. Id. at 1353.
26. Id. at 1352.
27. See David B. Wexler & Stanley E. Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric
Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 32–35, 53–55 (1971).
28. Id. at 33. In Maricopa County, appointed counsel were paid ten dollars per
case; in Pima County, appointed counsel were paid five dollars per case. Id. at 34.
Eventually, Pima County replaced private attorneys as appointed counsel with the Public
Defender. Id.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id. at 34.
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Wexler and Scoville reported that, in Maricopa County, attorneys not
only fail to act as advocates resisting the civil commitment of their
client, but rather, they promote commitment “by virtually presenting the
case against the patient.”31
In 1974, Elliott Andalman and David Chambers,32 after reviewing the
previously published studies of civil commitment proceedings in
Texas,33 Iowa,34 and Arizona,35 asserted that attorneys who “did virtually
nothing except stand passively at a hearing and add a falsely reassuring
patina of respectability to the proceedings . . . may in fact worsen the
client’s chances for release. The passive attorney may induce the judge
to believe that she concurs with the judge’s inclination to commit . . . .”36
The failure of counsel to act as adversary counsel—advocating
actively on behalf of a client to resist involuntary civil commitment—is
particularly acute among lawyers from the private bar who are appointed
shortly before the civil commitment hearing. These lawyers typically
have inadequate time to prepare, are inadequately compensated for their
efforts, lack experience in challenging psychiatric judgments, are
reluctant to appear foolish before the judge, and are uncertain as to their

31. Id. at 53.
32. Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing
Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43 (1974).
33. Id. at 58–59 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Austin, Texas, as
reported by Cohen, supra note 9, at 427–31, 445, 450).
34. Id. at 57 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Iowa, as reported by
Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 13, at 913–23). Because the Andalman and
Chambers article was published before the Iowa civil commitment statutes were revised,
they did not discuss the statutory changes, which were enacted in 1975, or the study of
attorney performance under the new statutes, which was published in 1979.
35. Id. at 55–57 (discussing civil commitment proceedings in Phoenix, Arizona, as
reported by Wexler & Scoville, supra note 27, at 32–35, 38–42, 51–60). Andalman and
Chambers also reported on their study of civil commitment proceedings in four cities—
New York, Chicago, Cleveland, and Memphis. Id. at 59–72. Hearings in the four cities
were personally observed by Elliott Andalman. Id. at 54 & n.38. He also interviewed
attorneys involved in those hearings. Id. at 54.
36. Id. at 72. In reaching their judgment about the effect of passive attorneys,
Andalman and Chambers also discussed and relied upon civil commitment proceedings
in Austin, Texas, as reported by Cohen, supra note 9, at 427–31, 445, 450, Iowa, as
reported by Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 13, at 913–23, and Phoenix,
Arizona, as reported by Wexler & Scoville, supra note 27, at 32–35, 38–42, 51–60.
Andalman & Chambers, supra note 32, at 55–59. But cf. Dennis L. Wenger & C.
Richard Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital:
A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 66, 70 (1969) (reporting
that in a study of eighty-one civil commitment hearings in Ohio, “[p]atients with legal
counsel were much less likely to be hospitalized than those without legal counsel”).

289

proper role in the proceeding.37 Nevertheless, in an early study of civil
commitment hearings conducted at Bellevue Hospital in New York City,
Thomas Litwack reported that the attorneys in the Mental Health
Information Service, who work full-time representing patients, only
“provide forceful representation in cases where they feel the patient
should and may be released by the court, but they provide weaker
representation in less hopeful cases.”38 In essence, these lawyers did not
always advocate for what the client perceived as the client’s self-interest.
Rather, the lawyers attempted to determine what they perceived as being
in their client’s best interest, “tacitly decid[ing] how ‘well’ or ‘sick’ a
particular client is—and how much the client needs hospitalization—and
then adjust[ing] their efforts at representation accordingly.”39
Over the years, numerous authors have responded to these and other
early studies40 of attorney performance—or more accurately,
37. Thomas R. Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816, 827–31 (1974). Even when such attorneys
received specialized training—training on how to aggressively challenge the psychiatric
expert who testifies for commitment—they “were reluctant to take an adversarial stance,
even with explicit support by the court.” Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric
Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 17 (1978). Attorneys continued to take “a more traditional,
passive, paternal stance toward the proposed patients.” Id. at 15.
38. Litwack, supra note 37, at 832; see also Andalman & Chambers, supra note
32, at 69.
39. Litwack, supra note 37, at 832. Litwack also suggested that even if the Mental
Health Information Service attorney did not believe that his or her client’s mental
condition met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, the attorney would
hesitate to argue forcefully before a judge and lose that judge’s respect, if the attorney
thought that the judge believed that commitment was appropriate in the case. Thus, if
the client acted out in court or exhibited delusions of persecution—which might not
justify commitment under the statute but might well induce a judge to order commitment—
the attorney would not advocate vigorously that commitment was not warranted. Id. at
833; see also Virginia Aldige Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment,
60 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1036, 1048 (1982) (reporting that in a study of 479 civil
commitment hearings conducted in North Carolina, not all full-time civil commitment
advocates chose an adversarial role for all cases).
40. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A
Need for a Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 33 (1967) (asserting that, in Wisconsin,
appointed counsel for prospective mental patients evaluate what they perceive to be in
the best interests of their clients and proceed to accomplish that objective regardless of
the will of their clients); Virginia Aldige Hiday, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment:
Changes, Effects, and Determinants, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 551, 559 (1977) (finding that
counsel for the proposed patient assumed an advocate’s role in fewer than half of the
contested civil commitment cases studied in North Carolina). “If the role of counsel is to
protect clients from involuntary confinement in mental institutions . . . then it appears
that in the majority of contested cases counsel is not functioning as it should.” Id. at
560; Hiday, supra note 2, at 665 (“[A]ttorneys . . . defer to psychiatric opinion because
they feel they lack the requisite expertise and want to obtain help for those in need.”);
Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt,
1976 WIS. L. REV. 503, 528 (finding that counsel for proposed patients do not conduct
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nonperformance—in civil commitment hearings, by challenging the
propriety of an attorney-determined, best-interest-of-the-client model of
representation41 and by asserting that a client-determined, self-interest

extensive cross-examination of the physicians who recommend involuntary commitment
and that some trials in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, are completed in five minutes).
Eighty percent of Wisconsin judges who responded to a survey expressed their belief
that an attorney representing a proposed patient should act in what the attorney perceives
as the client’s best interests if the attorney believes that the client is incompetent to make
a decision regarding the need for hospitalization, even if the attorney is acting contrary to
the client’s expressed wishes. Id. at 516.
41. A chronological listing of some of these books and articles includes, but is not
limited to, the following: RONALD S. ROCK, MARCUS A. JACOBSON & RICHARD M.
JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 160 (1968) (“[T]he
actual performance of defense counsel in hearing after hearing is substantially empty,
mere pretense at the work of an advocate who has no real work cut out for him.”);
Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1288 (1974) (“[C]ounsel often functions as no more than a clerk, ratifying the
events that transpire rather than influencing them.”); Mark Alan Hart, Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 7 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 93, 131 (1974) (“The role attorneys actually play in the commitment
hearing is indeed disturbing.”); CAROL A.B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT 140
(1982) (“[A]ttorneys view their clients as crazy and therefore refrain from standing
firmly in the way of their involuntary incarceration.”); Natalie Wolf, Note, The Ethical
Dilemmas Faced by Attorneys Representing the Mentally Ill in Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 173 (1992) (“Attorneys who assume a
guardian role in the civil commitment process frequently conduct their representation of
the allegedly mentally ill individual in disregard of traditional representation obligations
and in violation of the standards of professional responsibility.”); Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 37, 41 (1999) (asserting that attorneys who adopt a paternalistic role in
representing their clients in civil commitment hearings have “turned the adversarial
model into a farce and a mockery in which procedural rights are accorded in only a
formal way so as to effectuate what judges, lawyers, and clinicians perceive to be the
best interests of the patient”). Winick characterized such civil commitment hearings as
“phony rituals” that “may actually produce feelings of worthlessness and loss of dignity,
exacerbating the person’s mental illness and perhaps even fostering a form of learned
helplessness that can further diminish performance, motivation, and mood in ways that
can be antitherapeutic.” Id. at 45; Donald H. Stone, Giving a Voice to the Silent
Mentally Ill Client: An Empirical Study of the Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 70 UMKC L. REV. 603, 608 (2002) (“When the hospital presenter and the
client’s attorney speak in one voice, in which the doctor knows best and one is to ask no
questions, truth is compromised. The medical model, as opposed to the legal model, has
no proper place in the civil commitment arena.”); James B. (Jim) Gottstein, Involuntary
Commitment and Forced Psychiatric Drugging in the Trial Courts: Rights Violations as
a Matter of Course, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 51, 104 (2008) (“By abandoning the traditional
adversarial approach in favor of a paternalistic one—where . . . the lawyers assigned to
represent psychiatric respondents assume what the State wants to do to psychiatric
respondents is in their best interest—the State’s proposed actions are not subjected to the
normal litigation crucible.”).
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model of representation should be employed.42 Such a change is necessary
to replace attorney passivity with zealous advocacy. Despite this critical
commentary, however, passive paternalism perseveres. Michael Perlin,
a frequent critic of attorney performance in civil commitment cases,43
42. A chronological listing of some of these books and articles includes, but is not
limited to, the following: Hart, supra note 41, at 133–34 (“The attorney must force the
persons who are trying to commit the client to prove their case, as that term is
understood in other proceedings, or one is simply not fulfilling necessary obligations to
the client; instead of representing them, the lawyer has become a mere adjunct to the
client’s adversaries.”); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A
Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1563 (1975) (“If hearings are to be
meaningful procedures designed to arrive at fair dispositions based on a full presentation
of the facts, the lawyer must act as an adversary. Otherwise, the idea that due process is
being accorded the mentally ill individual will stand as little more than pretense.”);
James R. Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 157, 185
(1979) (“Unquestioned deference by the judicial decisionmaker to the psychiatrist must
be overcome through a defense which encourages the decisionmaker to focus on the
limitations and contradictions in the expert’s testimony.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 232
(“The lawyer, to fully represent the patient, must proceed as an advocate.”); WARREN,
supra note 41, at 153 (“In Metropolitan Court, what makes justice seem to the
nonparticipant audience not to be done is the obvious lack of correspondence between
what trials are supposed to seem like and what they actually are.”); Steven J. Schwartz et
al., Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the Dignity of People with Mental Disabilities:
Standards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 568 (1983) (“[T]he
proper role of legal advocacy for persons with disabilities must focus on the vindication
of individual legal rights. Legal advocacy provides the only countervailing force to the
medical and social authority that otherwise completely controls the lives of handicapped
persons.”); Wolf, supra note 41, at 180 (“If attorneys impose their own judgments they
defeat the purpose of the hearing and jeopardize the validity of the system.”); Jan C.
Costello, “Why Would I Need a Lawyer?” Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People with
Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 15, 27 (Bruce D.
Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996) (asserting that a best interest approach “is
fundamentally at odds with the principles underlying the Model Code [of Professional
Responsibility] and Model Rules [of Professional Conduct] and was explicitly rejected
by both judges and legislatures before the Model Rules were drafted”); Stone, supra note
41, at 614 (“The attorney’s role is to challenge the basis of the application for
involuntary admission and elicit facts and opinions challenging the need for
hospitalization.” (footnote omitted)); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: A Call for a Stricter Test in Civil Commitments, 27 J. LEGAL
PROF. 37, 40–41 (2002) (“Because lawyers have the same ethical obligations to
[mentally disordered] clients as to any other, one easy way to improve the system is for
attorneys to always perform their role of advocate.” (footnote omitted)); Gottstein, supra
note 41, at 93 (“By engaging in the traditional adversarial process, the courts—and
especially the lawyers representing psychiatric respondents—will be the instruments of
justice they should be . . . .”); see also 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2B-10.1, at 251 n.434 (citing
several additional law review articles favoring an advocacy approach to representation of
clients in civil commitment hearings rather than a best interests approach).
43. Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of
Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 164 (Summer
1982) (asserting that the record of counsel providing services to mentally ill clients has
never lived up to the standard of ardent defender of the client’s rights and freedoms).
“Lawyers who believe that ‘we have no choice but to trust the psychiatrist,’ or who
disregard their clients’ position because ‘they’re sick’ simply do not meet sixth amendment
due process standards.” Id. at 176 (footnotes omitted). “[P]ersons facing involuntary
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recently noted that, historically, the promise of counsel has been little
more than an illusion.44 “And so it remains today. The quality of counsel
assigned to represent individuals who face involuntary civil commitment
to psychiatric hospitals is, in most United States jurisdictions, mediocre
or worse.”45
III. THE INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL FOR MENTALLY
DISORDERED PERSONS IN HEARINGS TO IMPOSE
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
The doctrine of informed consent imposes a duty on physicians to
disclose to the patient the risks and benefits of, and the alternatives to,
the proposed treatment and to accept the patient’s decision to authorize
or refuse that treatment. In Canterbury v. Spence,46 the leading case on
the doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit declared: “[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests
seem to lie.”47 Therefore, “the patient’s right of self-decision shapes the
boundaries of the duty to reveal.”48 The adequacy of the physician’s
disclosures to the patient “must be measured by the patient’s need, and
that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality
civil commitment—and the concomitant loss of liberty—have a right to the same
‘traditional, adversarial, partisan’ counsel that ‘is the hallmark of the American judicial
system.’” Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael L. Perlin, Fatal
Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 39, 43 (1992) (“The record of the legal profession in providing
meaningful advocacy services to mentally disabled persons has been grossly
inadequate.”). “[T]here is little reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of universal
invigorated private representation of this population in the near future.” Id. at 45; 1
PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2B-8, at 227–28 (asserting that in representing mentally disabled
persons in matters affecting their hospitalization, counsel’s performance historically has
been inadequate, and courts have passively accepted this inadequacy, ignoring specific
ethical problems arising in such representation).
44. Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My
Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment
Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2008).
45. Id. at 243. Professor Perlin added, “If there has been any constant in modern
mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality that
counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely
to be ineffective.” Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
46. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47. Id. at 781.
48. Id. at 786.
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to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must
be unmasked.”49
Courts, however, recognize exceptions to patient autonomous judgment.
If, for example, the patient is unconscious or in such pain that he or she
is incapable of considering information about the proposed treatment or
making a decision as to whether to consent, and if treatment is
immediately necessary to prevent either death or a serious injury to the
patient, the physician is privileged to proceed in order to prevent that
disastrous consequence.50 In this emergency situation, the law presumes,
in the absence of information to the contrary, that the patient would
consent to treatment.51
Even in nonemergency situations, courts recognize an exception to the
informed consent requirement for incompetent persons.52 If an individual
has been adjudicated incompetent and a guardian has been appointed to
make personal53 decisions for that individual, the guardian may give
informed consent to medical treatment as the incompetent ward’s
substitute decisionmaker. Even without a court adjudication of incompetence,
minor children are conclusively presumed to be incompetent, and their
parents, as their legal guardians, may give informed consent to medical
treatment for them.54
49. Id. at 786–87 (footnote omitted). Other courts have articulated the patient’s
right to medical self-determination in similar terms. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d
1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (“The weighing of [the] risks [inherent in the procedure and the risks of
a decision not to undergo the treatment] against the individual subjective fears and hopes
of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical
judgment reserved to the patient alone.”).
50. See Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 413, 434–38 (discussing the emergency exception).
51. Meisel notes that the patient’s implied consent to emergency treatment is
premised on the presumption that a reasonable person would consent to emergency
treatment and therefore that this patient would also consent. Id. at 434. Meisel suggests
that such reasoning is “not so much a rationale as it is a restatement of the exception.” Id.
52. See id. at 439–53 (discussing the incompetency exception).
53. Traditionally, a guardian is appointed for either the person or the estate of the
incompetent person. A guardian of the person is authorized to make personal decisions
for the incompetent person, including providing for basic necessities of life, such as
food, clothing, and housing as well as deciding whether to consent to medical treatment.
A guardian of the estate is authorized to make decisions concerning the property of the
incompetent person. Sometimes a guardian is appointed for both the person and the
estate of the incompetent person.
54. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (declaring that if the
patient is a minor, “the authority to consent is transferred to the patient’s legal
guardian”). Courts have also recognized a therapeutic exception to the duty to disclose.
See Meisel, supra note 50, at 460–70. If the disclosure would harm the patient, the
physician is not required to inflict such harm by making the disclosure. For example, the
Canterbury court stated that a physician may withhold information if the patient would
“become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision,
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The first court decision to fully recognize a mental patient’s right to
medical self-determination was Rogers v. Okin,55 decided by a federal
district court in 1979. District Judge Joseph Tauro ruled that involuntarily
confined mental patients—just as any other patients—have a right to
make decisions about their treatment56 and may not be forcibly medicated.57
Just as with other patients, this right is not absolute, and the patient’s
informed consent is not required in an emergency or if the patient is
incompetent. If no emergency exists justifying treatment, the involuntarily
committed mental patient—just as any other patient—has a right to
make his or her own analysis of the risks and benefits of, and
alternatives to, the proposed treatment that the physician is required to
communicate to the patient, and to make his or her own decision to
accept or reject that treatment.58
The judge refused to equate the decision to involuntarily commit a
person with an adjudication of incompetence:59
The weight of evidence persuades this court that, although committed mental
patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most
are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be
or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the
patient.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. The Canterbury court cautioned, however, that the
therapeutic privilege must be “carefully circumscribed” so that it does not “devour the
disclosure rule itself.” Id. The court specifically rejected the paternalistic notion that the
physician may avoid disclosure simply because the physician thinks that the patient,
upon such disclosure, might reject the proposed treatment that the physician believes is
medically needed. Id.
55. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 634 F.2d
650 (1st Cir. 1980), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982),
on remand sub nom. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
56. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366.
57. Id. at 1371.
58. Id. at 1367. Judge Tauro noted that establishing a therapeutic alliance between
psychiatrist and patient is fundamental for successful treatment. Such an alliance
requires the patient to understand and willingly accept the prescribed treatment. Id. at
1361. The judge noted that the American Psychiatric Association accepts the requirement
that informed consent for treatment be obtained from the mental patient except in
emergency situations. Id. at 1370 n.37 (citing American Psychiatric Association Task
Force on the Right to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3 (1977)). The quoted material
from the American Psychiatric Association Task Force is actually located at 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 355 (1977).
59. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1359. In so ruling, Judge Tauro relied on a Department of
Mental Health regulation, codified in substance in a state statute, which provides that no
person admitted to or committed to a mental health facility shall lose the right to manage
his affairs, to contract, to hold a driver’s license, to make a will, to marry, to hold or
convey property, or to vote unless the person has been adjudicated incompetent. Id. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 24 (West 2003).
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expected from receiving psychotropic medication. This is particularly true for
patients who have experienced such medication and, therefore, have some basis
for assessing comparative advantages and disadvantages.60

The presumption that the patient is competent to make medication decisions
prevails, said the court, unless the patient has been adjudicated incompetent
by a court after a hearing on that issue.61 Although the state has an
obligation to make treatment available to involuntary patients, the state’s
interest in providing that treatment does not override the competent
patient’s fundamental right to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations.62
Judge Tauro’s refusal to equate the decision to civilly commit a person
with a finding of incompetence is logical. In most states, the commitment
laws do not presume or require incompetence as a criterion for civil
commitment.63 Merely because the person has been found to be
mentally disordered and dangerous to self or others, or unable to provide
for basic necessities—the typical criteria for commitment64—does not
60. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1361.
61. Id. The court scoffed at the defendant’s argument that a person who was
statutorily presumed to be competent to manage his or her affairs and dispose of his or
her property might not be presumed competent to decide whether to follow his or her
doctor’s advice regarding medication. “Such an argument would make a doubter of even
the most credulous.” Id. at 1361 n.12. Although the rights to hold and dispose of one’s
property are fundamental to any concept of ordered liberty, such rights “pale in
comparison to the intimate decision as to whether to accept or refuse psychotropic
medication—medication that may or may not make the patient better, and that may or
may not cause unpleasant and unwanted side effects.” Id. at 1366. Judge Tauro also
rejected the therapeutic exception to informed consent. Even if disclosure of potential
side effects of medication might frighten the patient and therefore might be considered as
“not [] in the patient’s best interest,” failure to provide the patient with sufficient
information to make an informed treatment decision is not justified. Id. at 1387.
62. Id. at 1367, 1370.
63. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The “Therapeutic Orgy” and the “Right to Rot”
Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV.
447, 472 n.88 (1990), for statutes declaring that civil commitment neither raises a
presumption of, nor constitutes a finding of, the patient’s incompetence. See also Dennis
E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 350 n.435 (1992), for court decisions separating the
commitment and competence issues. As the Alabama Supreme Court stated: “[A]
person involuntarily committed to a mental hospital is not ipso facto barred from the
invocation of the ‘informed consent’ doctrine.” Nolen v. Peterson, 544 So. 2d 863, 867
(Ala. 1989). As of 1985, only eight states even allowed the issues of civil commitment
and competency to be determined in the same proceeding. John Parry, Incompetency,
Guardianship, and Restoration, in SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 369, 374 n.35, 405–07 (3d ed. 1985).
64. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998) (authorizing detention,
without court order, for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat mentally disordered
persons who are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5200 (authorizing
court-ordered detention for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat persons who are a
danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5250 (authorizing certification for
fourteen days of intensive treatment for persons who are a danger to self or others or
gravely disabled); id. § 5260 (authorizing certification for an additional fourteen days of
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mean that the person is unable to understand the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to the medication that the physician is prescribing to treat his
or her condition. A mentally disordered person’s dangerousness or inability
to provide for basic necessities may justify a deprivation of liberty, but
without a separate determination of incompetence, such condition does
not justify depriving a patient of the right to refuse treatment and
substituting another’s judgment for that of the patient.65
When the Rogers case was appealed,66 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that Massachusetts recognized substantive
and procedural rights for involuntary mental patients that created for
them a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.67 Under Massachusetts law, the involuntary commitment
decision is not a determination that the committed person is incompetent

intensive treatment for imminently suicidal persons); id. § 5300 (authorizing postcertification
for a 180-day detention for persons who present a demonstrated danger of inflicting
substantial physical harm upon others).
65. See, e.g., In re L.A., 912 A.2d 977, 980–81 (Vt. 2006) (holding that the
standard for determining incompetence to refuse medication is different and more
difficult to establish than the standard to determine involuntary commitment, and the
mere fact that the patient refuses a medication that might be beneficial does not establish
the patient’s incompetence to do so); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1994)
(holding that, under the Wisconsin statute, the only standard applied to evaluate a
patient’s competency to refuse medication is “whether the patient is able to express an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of, and the alternatives to, accepting
medication or treatment”).
66. Following Judge Tauro’s decision, the Rogers case experienced a legal
odyssey. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment
in part and reversed in part, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the First Circuit for a determination of
whether a case decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, In re Guardianship
of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981), while certiorari was pending in Rogers, could
determine the rights and duties of the parties entirely under state law, Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 305–06 (1982). The First Circuit certified nine questions of state law to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1984). The Massachusetts court provided detailed answers to those questions. Rogers v.
Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 312–23 (Mass. 1983). The
questions certified by the First Circuit to the Massachusetts Supreme Court and answered
by that court appear at Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 312 n.8 (questions 1 through 3), 315 n.13
(questions 4 and 5), 319 n.23 (questions 6 and 7), 322 n.27 (questions 8 and 9). The
First Circuit relied upon those answers in rendering its decision. Specifically, the First
Circuit concluded that “the full panoply of rights set forth [by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 319–20] . . . equal or exceed the rights
provided in the federal Constitution.” Rogers, 738 F.2d at 9 (citation omitted).
67. Rogers, 738 F.2d at 9.
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to make treatment decisions.68 Thus, the patient retains the right to make
treatment decisions unless and until a judge adjudicates the patient
incompetent to make treatment decisions in proceedings to establish the
patient’s incompetence.69
In many states, the highest appellate courts have adopted right to
refuse treatment principles substantially identical to those announced in
the Rogers case by Judge Tauro in his 1979 district court decision or by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts four years later.70 The
68. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 312–14. The court noted that the standard for involuntary
commitment, that is, that the person is mentally ill and that the failure to commit would
create a likelihood of serious harm, is a commitment “for public safety purposes and
does not reflect lack of judgmental capacity. [The commitment standard] says nothing
concerning [the patient’s] competence to make treatment decisions.” Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 314. The court rejected the argument that doctors should be able to make
treatment decisions for involuntarily committed mental patients, even if such patients are
competent. Competent adults have the right to refuse treatment even if the medical
profession views their sense of values as unwise. Id. (quoting Harnish v. Children’s
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982)). The right to refuse treatment has
constitutional and common law origins that protect the individual’s “strong interest in
being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.” Id. (quoting
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977)). The state’s police power may be used to override a patient’s refusal of
medication only in an emergency situation in which the “patient poses an imminent
threat of harm to himself or others, and only if there is no less intrusive alternative to
antipsychotic drugs.” Id. at 321. The court, quoting In re Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 1981) noted that when such an emergency situation arises, “even
the smallest of avoidable delays would be intolerable.” Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
Even if the patient is adjudicated incompetent, treatment may not be imposed unless a
judge, making a substituted judgment decision for the patient, decides that the patient
would have consented to the treatment if he or she was competent to make the decision.
Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 315–16. According to the court, the right to refuse medical
treatment extends to incompetent as well as competent patients because both are entitled
to human dignity. Id. at 315 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427). The court rejected
decisionmaking determined by what doctors perceive as the patient’s best medical
interest. Because the patient bears the risks of treatment, treatment decisions are solely
the prerogative of the patient—even for incompetent patients. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at
316. The state’s parens patriae power may be used to override a patient’s refusal of
medication only in those rare circumstances in which such medication is necessary to
prevent the “immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental
illness.” Id. at 322 (quoting Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 55).
70. See, e.g., Goedecke v. State Dep’t of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979)
(relying on the patient’s common law right to give or withhold informed consent to
medical treatment and a statute, commonly found in many states, declaring that mental
patients do not forfeit any legal rights solely by reason of their involuntary commitment);
People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 971 (Colo. 1985) (citing the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts’s decision in Rogers, and specifically extending the prohibition against
forced treatment to incompetent mental patients); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139,
144–45, 148 (Minn. 1988) (ruling that the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication is “intrusive” treatment that seriously infringes upon the mental patient’s
right to privacy protected by the state constitution and that involuntary commitment does
not eliminate this fundamental right to the integrity of one’s own body and to consent—
or withhold consent—to invasions or alterations of one’s own body); Rivers v. Katz, 495
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authors of a leading coursebook on mental health law report that “virtually
every court that has considered the matter now recognizes a ‘right to
refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized populations, in the
process constitutionalizing a version of the informed consent doctrine in
that context.”71
In Washington v. Harper,72 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
mentally ill, sentence-serving prisoners possess “a significant liberty interest
in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”73 If
mentally ill prisoners have a right to refuse treatment, mentally ill
nonprisoners surely do. In fact, because civilly committed patients have
been confined without a criminal trial and without a criminal conviction,

N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the fundamental common law right of a
competent individual to make decisions concerning the individual’s own body “extends
equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or
dignity because of their illness”); id. at 341–42 (ruling that neither the presence of
mental illness nor a decision to involuntarily commit the mentally ill person is sufficient,
in and of itself, to conclude that the person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the
consequences of a decision to refuse medication); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749, 751
(Okla. 1980) (superseded by repeal of statute and subsequent legislation) (relying on the
constitutional right to privacy to uphold an involuntary mental patient’s right to refuse
treatment); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 892–94 (Wis. 1987)
(superseded by repeal of statute and subsequent legislation) (relying on the Equal
Protection Clause of the state and federal constitutions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the right of an involuntary mental patient to refuse treatment); id. at 894
(clarifying that although a finding of dangerousness is a prerequisite for involuntary
commitment, that finding does not establish the incompetence of the patient to accept or
refuse psychotropic medication).
71. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004); see also Michael L. Perlin, “May You Stay
Forever Young”: Robert Sadoff and the History of Mental Disability Law, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 242 (2005) (asserting that after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), “every state high court that has
considered [the question of whether a civilly committed mental patient has a right to
refuse treatment] has ruled that there is such a right”).
72. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
73. Id. at 221. The Court specifically identified a state administrative policy and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the sources of that liberty
interest. Id. at 221–22. The Court, however, did not require a judicial determination that
the prisoner was incompetent to make treatment decisions in order to subject him or her
to involuntary treatment. Id. at 222, 228. In the Court’s judgment, mentally ill prisoners
could be distinguished from civilly committed patients. For prisoners, the state’s
legitimate interest in prison safety and security warranted involuntary treatment of those
mentally disordered prisoners who were dangerous to themselves or others without the
requirement of a full court hearing. Id. at 225; see GRANT H. MORRIS, REFUSING THE
RIGHT TO REFUSE: COERCED TREATMENT OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS 78–86
(2006) (discussing and critiquing Harper).

299

MORRIS

7/6/2009 9:01:27 AM

their decisions to refuse treatment are entitled to special deference. The
state has exercised its authority to detain them because of their predicted
dangerousness or inability to provide for themselves. The state’s legitimate
interest in protecting them, and in protecting others from them, is
achieved by the confinement itself—without coerced treatment. If the
confined individual competently chooses to refuse treatment, even if that
decision may prolong his or her confinement, the individual’s constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing treatment should outweigh any
claimed governmental interest in coercing treatment. Michael Perlin,
citing Harper and two other Supreme Court decisions,74 asserts that the
Court has clearly recognized a qualified right to refuse treatment in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.75
Although the development of a mental patient’s right to refuse
treatment has been a popular subject for legal scholars,76 virtually
nothing has been written about the role of and adequacy of counsel in
representing mentally disordered patients who assert that right. Although
Michael Perlin devotes a 102-page unit of his Mental Disability Law
treatise to the role of counsel in civil commitment proceedings,77 he
devotes only three pages to the role of counsel in right to refuse
treatment proceedings.78 Professor Perlin cites only one article that
74. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the forcing of antipsychotic medication on criminal defendants
held for trial “absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness”); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–83 (2003) (discussing and
relying upon Harper and Riggins as setting the framework for determining whether and
under what circumstances the government may forcibly administer antipsychotic
medication to render a criminal defendant competent to stand trial); see MORRIS, supra
note 73, at 86–98 (discussing and critiquing the Sell decision).
75. Perlin, supra note 71, at 242. But see MORRIS, supra note 73, at 29–167, for a
discussion of various ways in which a mental patient’s right to refuse treatment is
undermined. For example, some courts have substituted an informal review of the
patient’s decision to refuse treatment—conducted by a staff psychiatrist or hospital
committee—for a court review of the patient’s competency to refuse treatment. See, e.g.,
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838, 850–51, 853 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded,
458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983). Professor Perlin has
characterized the Rennie professional judgment model as a “limited due process model”
as contrasted with the Rogers “expanded due process model.” See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra
note 2, § 3B–7.2, at 260–61; Perlin, supra note 71, at 242. Nevertheless, I believe that
substituting an informal review of a patient’s decision to refuse treatment by a staff
psychiatrist or hospital committee for a formal hearing on the patient’s competency by a
judge or other law-trained decisionmaker replaces due process with less than due
process. See generally MORRIS, supra note 73, at 29–53.
76. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3B-1 to 3B-2, at 155 n.1, 157 n.2, 165–67
nn.27–33 (citing sources); see also Grant H. Morris, Dr. Szasz or Dr. Seuss: Whose
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment?, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283 (1981).
77. 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 2B-1 to 2B-15, at 191–292.
78. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 360–63. Incredibly, Professor Perlin’s
three-page discussion of the adequacy of counsel in right to refuse treatment proceedings
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addresses the adequacy of counsel in this context,79 and the author of that
article urges attorneys to adopt a paternalistic, best interests approach to
representing patients who refuse treatment.80
In a recent article, Professor Perlin asserted that lawyers perform a
“mediocre job”81 in representing persons in the civil commitment process
and an “equally mediocre job”82 in representing mental patients in the
right to refuse treatment process. It is logical to assume that if lawyers
do not actively represent mentally disordered clients in involuntary
civil commitment hearings, they are even less likely to actively represent
involuntarily committed mental patients in hearings to establish their
competence to refuse treatment. If lawyers defer to medical judgment in
the decision of whether a mentally disordered person should be involuntarily
confined, they are more likely to defer to medical judgment that an
involuntarily committed patient who refuses treatment lacks competence
to do so. After all, the doctor is the most qualified individual to
determine what medication is appropriate to treat the patient’s mental
condition. Surely, a decision by the patient to accept the prescribed
medication that may result in an improved mental condition with the
potential for release from confinement will be viewed by the doctor—as
well as by the patient’s lawyer—as the rational decision. If the patient
rejects the doctor’s choice, a fortiori, the patient is perceived to be
incompetent to make that unwise decision.

is located within a 233-page unit devoted to the topic of the right to refuse treatment. Id.
at §§ 3B-1 to 3B-16, at 153–385.
79. Id. § 3B-11, at 360 n.1623 (citing Melvin R. Shaw, Professional Responsibility
of Attorneys Representing Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic
Medication, 22 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 186 (1989)). In the most recent cumulative
supplement to Professor Perlin’s treatise, he cites one other article on the subject. 2
PERLIN, supra note 2, § 3B-11, at 360 n.1623 (Supp. 2008) (citing Neal Milner, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: Four Case Studies of Legal Mobilization, 21 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 447 (1987)). Surprisingly, Milner’s article was published in 1987, two years prior
to the publication of Shaw’s article cited in the treatise itself.
80. Shaw, supra note 79, at 191. Shaw asserts that attorneys need to consider the
medical consequences to patients from their decisions to refuse treatment. Id. at 191–92.
Without needed medication, patients may “stagnate or deteriorate as inpatients, indefinitely or
permanently.” Id. at 190. Shaw favors abridging a patient’s right to refuse treatment in
order to quickly restore the patient’s health and freedom. Id. at 192.
81. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It
Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 737 (2005).
82. Id.
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IV. THE USE OF MENTAL HEALTH CONSERVATORSHIPS TO
ACHIEVE CIVIL COMMITMENT AND INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT IN CALIFORNIA
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act (LPS), which made fundamental changes in the standards and
procedures for civil commitment.83 LPS was hailed as “the Magna Carta
of the mentally ill.”84 LPS has been commended by writers85 and judges,86
serving as a model of progressive legislation that has been copied by
other state legislatures.87 With only some minor tinkering over the
years, LPS remains the law today in California. Under LPS, if a person,
as a result of mental disorder, is believed to be a danger to others, a
danger to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, the person may be
detained for an initial seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation
period.88 Thereafter, the person may be certified for a fourteen-day

83. Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, entitled Community
Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch.
1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4053, 4074. Division 5 consists of two parts: the LantermanPetris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000–5550 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008),
which provides the standards and procedures for civil commitment, and the BronzanMcCorquodale Act (formerly the Short-Doyle Act), id. §§ 5600–5772, which provides
the legislative framework for the organizing and financing of “community mental health
services for the mentally disordered in every county through locally administered and
locally controlled community mental health programs.” Id. § 5600 (West 1998).
84. The statement is attributed to Maurice Rodgers, spokesperson for the
California State Psychological Association. EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN
POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA 126 (1972).
Other writers also state that LPS has been described as the Magna Carta of the mentally
ill, but they do not reveal the source of the statement. See, e.g., Constitutional Rights of
the Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 316 (1970) (statement of Dr. Roger
Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare); Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered
Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 101, 105 (1972).
85. See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS xvi (2d ed.
1976) (characterizing the California experiment as “innovative” and declaring that LPS
“must be considered throughout any discussion of mental health programs”).
86. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 742, 753 (1969) (“[LPS] promises virtually to eliminate involuntary hospitalization
except for short-term crisis situations. . . . The procedural protections it promises are
impressive indeed when compared with commitment proceedings in other states.”).
87. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010–71.05.940 (West 2008).
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998) (authorizing detention, without
court order, for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat mentally disordered persons who
are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled); id. § 5200 (authorizing court-ordered
detention for seventy-two hours to evaluate and treat persons who are a danger to self or
others or gravely disabled).
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intensive treatment period if he or she is determined to be dangerous or
gravely disabled.89
LPS eliminates indeterminate commitment of nondangerous, mentally
ill persons and uses conservatorships for gravely disabled patients who
need assistance in managing their affairs after they have been treated in a
mental hospital for seventeen days or less.90 For a conservator to be
appointed, the court must find that the patient is gravely disabled.
“Grave disability” is defined as “[a] condition in which [the] person, as a
result of mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic
personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”91 The conservatorship is
established for a one-year period, but it may be reestablished upon proof
of continuing grave disability.92
At the time a conservatorship is established, the court may grant the
conservator93 the authority to place the conservatee in a mental hospital

89. Id. § 5250 (authorizing certification for fourteen days of intensive treatment for
persons who are a danger to self or others or gravely disabled).
90. The California legislative subcommittee that recommended revision of
California’s civil commitment statutes issued a report that served as a resource document
for the LPS legislation. That report recommended the creation of LPS conservatorships
to provide continuing assistance in managing the affairs of those gravely disabled
patients who needed such assistance following treatment during a fourteen-day certification.
SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: A
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 133 (1966).
91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998).
92. Id. § 5361.
93. A statute provides that the selection of a conservator shall be subject to the
following list of priorities: (1) the nominee of the proposed conservatee if the proposed
conservatee has sufficient capacity to make an intelligent preference; (2) the spouse or
domestic partner of the proposed conservatee; (3) an adult child of the proposed
conservatee; (4) a parent of the proposed conservatee; (5) a brother or sister of the
proposed conservatee; (6) any other person or entity eligible for appointment as a
conservator. However, the statute also provides that appointment of a conservator is
subject to this list of priorities “unless the officer providing conservatorship investigation
recommends otherwise to the superior court.” Id. § 5350(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008)
(incorporating by reference the list of priorities in CAL. PROB. CODE § 1812(b) (West
2002)). In practice, the conservatorship investigator almost invariably recommends the
appointment of a public agency—such as the Office of the Public Conservator—as
conservator, and the court almost invariably accepts the recommendation. See Grant H.
Morris, Conservatorship for the “Gravely Disabled”: California’s Nondeclaration of
Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 226–27 (1978) (finding that relatives or
friends were selected as conservator in only three of the 461 cases in which LPS
conservatorships were established in San Diego County over a nine-month period).
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or other mental treatment facility94 and to require the conservatee to
receive treatment to remedy or prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s
condition of grave disability.95 Although the court, in appointing a
conservator for a gravely disabled person, has discretion to grant or to
withhold such authority, the court almost always grants it to the conservator.96
California statutes provide that a mentally competent person may
apply for voluntary admission to a mental treatment facility, or if the
person is a conservatee, the conservatee’s conservator may apply if the
court has granted the conservator the authority to place the conservatee
in such a facility.97 However much the conservatee protests, the
conservatee is admitted to that facility as a voluntary patient. However
much the conservatee protests, the conservatee may be required to take
psychotropic medication that the doctor prescribes and that the conservator,
exercising a substituted judgment for the conservatee, authorizes.
Elsewhere, I characterize these conservatorship statutes as “California’s
nondeclaration of nonindependence,”98 laws that allow civil commitment
and coerced treatment without the crunch.99 For conservatees, there is
no involuntary civil commitment hearing. For conservatees, there is no
right to refuse treatment hearing. Under California’s “Magna Carta of the
mentally ill,” conservators are given carte blanche control over conservatees.
The use of conservatorships to assure involuntary detention and
coercive treatment is the option of choice for civilly committed patients
whom society deems worthy of long-term control. In the most current
report available, the California Department of Mental Health reveals that
in the 2005–2006 fiscal year, 138,295 adults were detained on seventytwo-hour evaluation holds as dangerous to self, dangerous to others, or
gravely disabled.100 Of that number, 57,386 were subsequently detained
on fourteen-day intensive treatment certifications, using the same commitment
criteria.101 How many of those individuals were subsequently detained
for a 180-day period as presenting “a demonstrated danger of inflicting
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1), (2) (West 1998). The placement,
however, must be “in the least restrictive alternative placement, as designated by the
court.” Id. § 5358(a)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 5358(b).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 240–41.
97. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6000(a) (West 1998). Although other voluntary
patients may depart the facility by giving notice of a desire to do so, LPS conservatees
may depart only if notice is given by their conservators. Id. § 6002.
98. Morris, supra note 93, at 201.
99. Id. at 215.
100. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, CAL. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION DATA—FISCAL YEAR 2005–2006 (July 1, 2005–June 30, 2006), at 3 tbl.1
(2008), http://www.dmh.ca.gov/Statistics_and_Data_Analysis/docs/InvoluntaryDetention_
FY05-06/Rep0506_FINAL.pdf.
101. Id. at 5 tbl.3.
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substantial physical harm upon others”?102 Only twenty-one met that
standard.103 Is it likely that after only seventeen days or less of inpatient
hospitalization, there were only twenty-one dangerously mentally
disordered people in the entire state of California? Highly doubtful!
But many of those who were initially detained as dangerous to others
were suddenly found to be gravely disabled and were processed through
the conservatorship route.104 For fiscal year 2005–2006, a total of
10,004 conservatorships were established.105 Thus, conservatorships
were used in 99.8% of cases (that is, 10,004 LPS conservatorships out of
10,025 total cases) in which long-term control over a mentally disordered
person (that is, 180 days or longer) was regarded as appropriate. Over
thirty years ago, Dr. Alan Stone characterized conservatorships as the “one
escape hatch” used to prolong confinement of mentally disordered persons
in California.106 His characterization is equally appropriate today.
This grant of authority to conservators to involuntarily commit their
conservatees as “voluntary” patients and to impose treatment upon them
102. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998) (establishing the criteria for
180-day involuntary commitment of demonstrably dangerous persons). Although the
danger criteria of section 5300 are rarely used to involuntarily commit patients in
California, the criteria are frequently used to impose involuntary treatment on patients
already committed as mentally disordered offenders. In In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 234
(Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court held that mentally disordered offenders are
“the only class of LPS patients” that are not afforded the right to refuse treatment; but see
MORRIS, supra note 73, at 123–39 (critiquing the Qawi decision).
103. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 8 tbl.6.
104. Even in habeas corpus hearings conducted shortly after a person was initially
detained as both dangerous to others and gravely disabled, the grounds for confinement
were “bargained down” to grave disability only. Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary
Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s LantermanPetris-Short Act, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 629, 645 (1977). Grave disability has become
the “catchall” category to continue commitment of a patient when it might be difficult to
prove that the patient was a danger to others. Id. at 646. A dangerous or potentially
dangerous patient who has been reclassified as gravely disabled is eligible for a
conservatorship. Id. at 648.
105. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 9 tbl.7. In its statistical
report, the Department of Mental Health listed these conservatorships as “permanent
conservatorships.” Id. However, under the LPS statutes, conservatorships are established for
a one-year period. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998). The conservatorship
may be reestablished for successive one-year periods upon a finding that the conservatee
continues to be gravely disabled. Id. In addition to the 10,004 one-year conservatorships,
5297 temporary conservatorships were established during fiscal year 2005–2006.
STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 9 tbl.7. Temporary conservatorships
are established for thirty days pending a determination of whether a one-year
conservatorship is appropriate. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West 1998).
106. ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 64 (1976).
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over their objection cannot be justified. In Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital
& Medical Center,107 the California Court of Appeal held that mental
patients involuntarily committed pursuant to California’s seventy-twohour treatment and evaluation hold108 or subsequently certified for fourteen
days pursuant to California’s intensive treatment hold109 could not be
required to take psychotropic medication against their will in nonemergency
situations.110 “It is one of the cardinal principles of LPS,” said the court,
“that mental patients may not be presumed incompetent solely because
of their hospitalization.”111 The individual’s right to give or withhold
consent to medical treatment—including treatment with psychotropic
medication—“does not disappear upon involuntary commitment.”112
Before treatment can be imposed on an involuntary patient without the
patient’s consent, the Riese court required that “there must be an
evidentiary hearing directed to the question whether the patient is able to
understand and knowingly and intelligently act upon information
required to be given regarding the treatment.”113 The court conducting that
hearing must determine the patient’s incapacity by clear and convincing
evidence.114 If the court determines that the involuntary patient possesses
the capacity to give informed consent to psychotropic medication and the

107. 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1987), review granted, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988),
review dismissed and court of appeal opinion ordered published, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal.
1989), republished opinion, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Ct. App. 1987). Hereinafter, the Riese
case will be cited to the court’s republished opinion. For a more detailed discussion of
the Riese case and its implementation, see Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the
Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 365–84 (1995).
108. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998).
109. Id. § 5250.
110. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (holding that involuntarily committed patients
have the right to exercise informed consent). The Riese court relied upon numerous
statutory provisions to support the requirement of informed consent by involuntarily
committed mental patients. See id. at 204–10. The court specifically rejected the
argument that the failure of LPS to explicitly grant to involuntary patients the right to
refuse psychotropic medication constitutes a basis for denying them that right. Id. at
208. Although the court withheld judgment on whether constitutional bases also support
informed consent in this context, id. at 201, it noted that the right of persons not
adjudicated incompetent to give or withhold consent to medical treatment—including
treatment with psychotropic medication—is protected both by the common law and by
the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 207–08. California courts uphold decisions by
competent adults to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 208 (discussing Bartling v.
Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984)). Logically, they cannot reject
non-life-threatening medication-refusal decisions by competent mental patients.
111. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
112. Id. at 213.
113. Id. at 211. In so ruling, the court adopted LPS statutory provisions governing
the determination of a patient’s capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy,
declaring that those provisions were “equally appropriate” to the determination of a
patient’s capacity to decide whether to consent to psychotropic medication. Id.
114. Id.
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patient refuses to do so, “the patient may not be required to undergo the
treatment.”115
In 1991, two years after the Riese decision was republished, the
California Legislature enacted statutes that confirm and codify, with
some modifications,116 Riese’s competency hearing requirement.117 The
legislation specifically declares that involuntarily committed mental
patients have a right to refuse treatment with psychotropic medication.118
Even if a patient is determined to lack the capacity to refuse treatment,
the legislation provides that such incapacity remains in effect only for
the duration of the seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day detention period.
If a finding of grave disability is not sufficient, in and of itself, to
warrant coerced treatment of an involuntarily detained mental patient,
then is a finding of grave disability, made in a hearing to establish a
conservatorship, sufficient to warrant coerced treatment of a conservatee?
The answer, according to the California statutes, is yes. Although the
Riese court ruled that mental patients are not presumed incompetent
solely because of their hospitalization,119 and although the establishment
of a conservatorship is not an adjudication that the conservatee is
incompetent120 or is incapable of making treatment decisions,121 nevertheless,
115. Id. at 212.
116. For example, instead of judicial hearings to determine a patient’s capacity to
give or withhold informed consent, the statute uses administrative hearings, conducted
by a superior court judge, a court-appointed commissioner or referee, or a courtappointed hearing officer. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5334(c) (West 1998). At such
hearings, patients are represented by counsel or by an advocate. Id. § 5333(a).
117. Act of Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 681, 1991 Cal. Stat. 3076 (codified at CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 5008(l)–(m), 5325.2, 5332–5337 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008)).
118. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.2 (West 1998). The right to refuse medication is
not absolute; it is subject to statutory limitations. Id.
119. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
120. Id. at 204 (“Appointment of a conservator under LPS . . . does not involve an
adjudication of incompetence . . . .”). In Board of Regents v. Davis, 533 P.2d 1047 (Cal.
1975), the California Supreme Court noted that LPS conservatorships, which are
established for persons who are gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder or
impairment by chronic alcoholism, are identical to Probate Code conservatorships
established for other reasons. Id. at 1053. Probate Code conservatorships were created
statutorily in 1957 as an alternative to guardianships in order to avoid the stigma of the
label “incompetency.” Id. at 1051. Conservatorship law should not be interpreted to
strip the competent conservatee of decisionmaking authority. See id. at 1054. See
generally Morris, supra note 93, at 208–14 (discussing similarities and differences in
Probate Code guardianships, Probate Code conservatorships, and LPS conservatorships
in California).
121. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (“Appointment of a conservator under LPS . . .
does not involve an adjudication of . . . incapacity to make treatment decisions about
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in reality, conservatees are presumed incompetent solely because of their
status as conservatees. Although the Riese court ruled that an individual’s
right to withhold consent to psychotropic medication “does not disappear
upon involuntary commitment,”122 that right does disappear for conservatees
when their conservators order them to undergo treatment as “voluntary”
patients.
Surely, one would assume that the judge establishing the conservatorship
is required to make some new finding of fact that the conservatee is
incapable of making rational treatment decisions before the judge grants
authority to the conservator to place the conservatee in a mental hospital
or other mental treatment facility and to require the conservatee to
accept treatment. In dicta, the Riese court suggested that conservatees
retain the right to refuse medical treatment “unless the court, after making
appropriate findings, specifically denies the conservatee this right in its
order and authorizes the conservator to make informed consent decisions.”123
one’s own body.”); see also Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 751 (Ct. App. 1986)
(“LPS conservatees have a right to refuse involuntary long-term psychotropic medication
absent a judicial determination of their incompetency to do so.”); 60 Ops. Cal. Att’y
Gen. 375, 377 (1977) (“[T]he conservatee is not divested of the right to make his or her
own medical decisions absent a specific determination by the court that the conservatee
cannot make those decisions.”).
122. Riese, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
123. Id. at 204–05 (emphasis added); see also Keyhea, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 755 (noting
that under LPS, a court determination of incompetency is required before long-term
psychotropic medication may be administered without a patient’s consent); 60 Ops. Cal.
Att’y Gen. 375, 377 (1977) (asserting that the court should not divest the conservatee of
the right to make medical decisions “unless it finds that the conservatee lacks the mental
capacity to rationally understand the nature of the medical problem, the proposed
treatment and the attendant risks”).
Because Riese was a class action lawsuit involving patients involuntarily detained on
seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day holds, the court’s statement about rights of conservatees is
dictum. Years later, in In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 233 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme
Court discussed, approvingly, the Riese decision. The Qawi court stated: “[T]he reasoning of
Riese makes clear that the right does not apply solely to short-term LPS patients.” Id.
The Qawi court asserted that individuals placed on one-year renewable conservatorships
as gravely disabled possess the right to refuse psychotropic medication absent a judicial
determination of their incompetence to make treatment decisions. Id. at 233–34. The
Qawi court also cited approvingly Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1986),
for the proposition that “LPS conservatees have a right to refuse involuntary long-term
psychotropic medication absent a judicial determination of their incompetency to do so.”
Qawi, 81 P.3d at 234 (quoting Keyhea, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 751). Qawi, however, was a case
involving a mentally disordered offender, not an LPS conservatee. Keyhea was a case
involving a mentally ill prisoner, not an LPS conservatee. Neither Qawi nor Keyhea
directly considered whether individuals placed on an LPS conservatorship retain the right to
refuse treatment unless they are adjudicated incompetent. Neither Qawi nor Keyhea directly
considered whether, in the absence of legislation specifically mandating a competency
hearing, the court establishing the conservatorship is precluded from authorizing the
conservator to make treatment decisions for the conservatee without first conducting
such a hearing. No other California Supreme Court or California Court of Appeal case
has considered or decided these issues. These issues remain for future determination.
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LPS conservatorship legislation, however, imposes no obligation on
the court that establishes a conservatorship to make “appropriate findings”
before granting the conservator placement and treatment authority over
the conservatee. LPS conservatorship legislation imposes no obligation
on the court to determine that the conservatee is incompetent—that the
conservatee lacks the mental capacity to give or withhold informed
consent—before it grants the conservator the authority to order treatment
that is imposed over the conservatee’s objection. In fact, LPS
conservatorship legislation does not even require that the court make any
additional determination beyond a finding of grave disability. Rather, an
LPS conservatorship statute merely provides that the conservatorship
investigator’s report to the court “shall contain his or her recommendations
concerning the powers to be granted to . . . the conservator.”124 The next
statute provides that the conservatorship investigator’s report shall
recommend for or against the imposition of various disabilities on the
conservatee, specifically mentioning as one such disability the right to
refuse or consent to treatment related to the conservatee’s condition of
grave disability.125 The statute following that one merely provides that
“[a] conservator shall . . . have the right, if specified in the court order, to
require his or her conservatee to receive treatment related specifically to
remedying or preventing the recurrence of the conservatee’s being
gravely disabled . . . .”126 Apparently, the finding of grave disability is
sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant the court authorizing the conservator to
place the conservatee in a mental hospital or other mental treatment
facility and to require the conservatee to accept treatment.127

124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5356 (West 1998).
125. Id. § 5357.
126. Id. § 5358(b). The statutory language empowering the conservator to require
the conservatee to receive treatment to prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s grave
disability seems inappropriate. A conservatorship is established for a person who is currently
gravely disabled. If the conservatee is no longer gravely disabled, the conservatorship should
terminate. Mere concern that the condition of grave disability might recur is insufficient to
continue the conservatorship and to continue the conservator’s power to require the
conservatee to receive treatment. See id. § 5364 (authorizing the conservatee, at sixmonth intervals, to petition for a rehearing on his or her status as a conservatee).
127. Morris, supra note 93, at 228; see infra text accompanying notes 239–41
(discussing a recent study conducted in San Diego County that revealed that in every
case in which the court established or reestablished a conservatorship, the court authorized the
conservator to place the conservatee in a mental hospital or other mental treatment facility and
to require the conservatee to receive treatment for his or her mental condition).
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One need only examine the facts of the Riese case to realize that
conservatees, despite their inability to provide for their basic necessities
of food, clothing, and shelter, can be competent to make treatment decisions
regarding their mental disorder. Eleanor Riese, the named plaintiff in
the class action suit, entered St. Mary’s Hospital as a voluntary patient.
Prior to this admission, she had been treated for chronic schizophrenia
with Mellaril,128 a psychotropic medication. As a result of that earlier
treatment, her bladder had been severely damaged. Nevertheless, the
treating doctor prescribed Mellaril, and she consented to its use. When
she suffered side effects and refused further treatment with Mellaril, she
was forcibly injected and was committed as an involuntary patient. A
week later, a conservatorship was recommended, and subsequently a
conservatorship was established. The court authorized the conservator
to place Ms. Riese in a mental hospital and to require her to accept
treatment over her objection. When she refused to ingest medication
orally, she was forcibly medicated intramuscularly.129 According to the
Riese court, Ms. Riese “continued to suffer from swollen feet, urinary
problems, shaking, memory loss and seizures.”130
Ms. Riese died on April 6, 1991. She was forty-seven years old.
Although no autopsy was performed, her death was attributed to renal
failure resulting from the cumulative effects of medication she had
received over her lifetime.131 Was Ms. Riese’s refusal to take psychotropic
medication a competent decision based on rational reasons? Yes. Was
her decision accepted by the treating physicians, by her conservator, and
by the court? No. One could easily conclude that conservatorships are
not established to provide needed assistance to conservatees who are
unable to provide for food, clothing, and shelter. Rather, conservatorships
are established in order to subject conservatees to long-term treatment
with psychotropic medication despite their protests.

128. Mellaril® was the Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation brand of thioridazine
HCI. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2168 (49th ed. 1995). Today, physicians receive a
“black box” warning that thioridazine has the “POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT,
POSSIBLY LIFE-THREATENING, PROARRHYTHMIC EFFECTS” and “SHOULD
BE RESERVED FOR USE IN THE TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS
WHO FAIL TO SHOW AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TO ADEQUATE COURSES
OF TREATMENT WITH OTHER ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS.” PHYSICIANS’ DESK
REFERENCE 2182 (62d ed. 2008).
129. Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201–02 (Ct. App.
1987).
130. Id. at 202.
131. Telephone Interview with Colette Hughes, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., cocounsel for Eleanor Riese in Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. (July 11, 1994).

310

MORRIS

[VOL. 46: 283, 2009]

7/6/2009 9:01:27 AM

“Let’s Do the Time Warp Again”
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

V. MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN CONSERVATORSHIP
HEARINGS CONDUCTED IN 1975 AND THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY INADEQUACY
Eight years after LPS was enacted into law,132 I asked students in my
seminar in Law and Mental Disorder to observe the conservatorship
proceedings in the San Diego County Superior Court and gather data on
the performance of attorneys representing individuals for whom a
conservatorship was proposed.133 The students observed sixty-three court
hearings and reported the following data.134 Eight hearings were one minute
or less in duration. Nineteen hearings were between one and two minutes in
duration. Nine hearings were between two and three minutes in duration.
Thus, more than half the hearings—a total of thirty-six of the sixty-three
that were observed—were completed in three minutes or less.135 The average
duration of these LPS conservatorship hearings—less than three minutes—
was actually shorter than the 4.7 minute average duration of civil commitment
hearings conducted prior to the adoption of the LPS legislation.136
In forty-two of the sixty-three cases, counsel representing a proposed
conservatee asked no questions of the reporting psychiatrist. In most of
the remaining twenty-one cases, the lawyer asked only one question. In
only one case did the proposed conservatee’s counsel request either the
assistance of a psychiatrist or the examination of the proposed conservatee
by another psychiatrist. There was not a single case in which counsel for
the proposed conservatee offered testimony of an independent psychiatrist.
In fifty-six of the sixty-three cases, no questions were asked of the
proposed conservatee.
In fifty-eight of the sixty-three cases, counsel for the proposed
conservatee neither proposed alternatives to conservatorship nor even
suggested that others explore these possibilities. In only five cases did
counsel for the proposed conservatee recommend any specific person be
appointed as conservator if a conservatorship was established. In only two
cases did counsel for the proposed conservatee request that a conservatorship,
if established, terminate sooner than the one-year statutory maximum.
132. Although LPS was enacted in 1967, the operative date of the legislation was July 1,
1969. California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch. 1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4053, 4074.
133. See Morris, supra note 93, at 225.
134. See id. at 232–33.
135. Id. at 232 n.173. Only nine hearings were more than eight minutes in duration. Id.
136. SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, supra note 90, at 43.
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Among the disabilities that the court, in establishing a conservatorship,
may impose upon the conservatee are suspension of the privilege to
possess a license to operate a motor vehicle and the right to enter into
contracts.137 In only one of the sixty-three cases did a lawyer urge that
the proposed conservatee be permitted to retain his or her driver’s
license, and in no case did a lawyer resist the imposition of contractual
disability on his or her client. Most significantly, in only two of the
sixty-three cases did the lawyer for the proposed conservatee oppose
granting authority to the conservator to place the conservatee in a mental
treatment facility where he or she would be subjected to involuntary
treatment for his or her mental disorder.
Clearly, the conservatorship hearings observed by my students were
meaningless formalities, “show” trials, an “empty shell,” to borrow
words from Michael Perlin and Deborah Dorfman, “offering only an
illusion of due process.”138 Rolling over and playing dead is not
competent representation. Rolling over and playing dead is not zealous
advocacy on behalf of one’s client.
Perhaps, it could be argued, such attorney inaction at the conservatorship
hearing was appropriate. The attorney may have made a reasoned
decision not to contest conservatorship because the evidence of grave
disability was so overwhelming that resistance was both futile and
unwarranted. But that is not what occurred. Attorney nonperformance
at trial was a direct result of the failure of attorneys to investigate the
facts and to fully prepare their clients’ cases. At the time of this study,
attorneys for proposed conservatees who were indigent—and most
were indigent—were appointed approximately once every six months
as their names rotated up on an appointments list. They were paid
seventy-five dollars per case for their work.139 For this small fee, most
attorneys made one visit to the client in the facility where the client was
137. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West 1998). Other disabilities that can be
imposed by the court are disqualification from voting and possessing a firearm, and the
right to refuse treatment, whether related or unrelated to the conservatee’s condition of
grave disability. Id.
138. Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions
and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
114, 130 (1996).
139. See Morris, supra note 93, at 234 n.177. In 1975, San Diego County paid
$57,975 to lawyers representing proposed conservatees in 742 hearings. These attorneys
were paid at a base rate of $75 per case, an increase from the $50 per case paid to attorneys in
1974. Extra payment was allowed when continuances were granted or when attorneys were
able to convince the judge that extra work or extra expenses warranted such payment.
With this extra payment, San Diego County spent an average of $78.13 per conservatorship
case in 1975 ($57,975 divided by 742 equals $78.13). Typically, an attorney was assigned to
two cases at the time the attorney’s name rotated up for appointment. Id.
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detained, ensured that the papers in the case were in order, and made
an appearance at the conservatorship hearing. Some attorneys did even
less. Several were observed meeting their clients for the first time at the
hearing itself. Appointed counsel almost never attended the psychiatric
evaluation of their client that was performed a few days prior to the
hearing, although they were permitted to do so. Most attorneys did not
even examine the psychiatric report prior to the hearing, even though the
report was almost always entered into evidence upon stipulation and was
often the most significant evidence in the case supporting the appointment
of a conservator. Some attorneys expressed concern that if they “make
waves” at the hearing, they could jeopardize their chances of being appointed
to represent proposed conservatees in future cases.
In Conservatorship of Roulet,140 decided one year after the study was
published, the California Supreme Court held that even though the
process to establish an LPS conservatorship is a civil process in which
the state is acting benevolently to assist the disabled person,
nevertheless, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity are
constitutionally mandated standards necessary to ensure that mental
health conservatorships are established only for individuals who have
been accurately determined to be gravely disabled.141 The court articulated
several reasons to justify its decision to impose criminal due process
safeguards. First, the court equated the establishment of a conservatorship
with involuntary civil commitment. “One of the principal powers which
the court may grant a conservator is the right to place a conservatee in an
institution.”142 A conservatee “can be involuntarily confined in a mental
hospital for up to a year by his or her conservator, with the possibility of
additional year-long extensions.”143 Thus, despite its civil label, establishment
of a conservatorship “threatens a person’s liberty . . . on as massive a scale
as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”144
In addition to the loss of freedom from physical restraint, the
conservatee is subject to various statutory disabilities—both within the
140. 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
141. Id. at 11. The court specifically “requir[ed] the state to match its good intentions
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is in need of the state’s care.” Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id. The court cited People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 360–62 (Cal. 1975), for
the proposition that civil commitment threatens a person’s liberty to the extent that
occurs with a criminal conviction. The court then asserted that the logic of Burnick is
“equally applicable” to conservatorships. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 3.
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LPS statutes and apart from LPS—that may subject the conservatee to an
even greater control over his or her life and a more serious deprivation of
personal liberty than occurs when a person is convicted of a crime.145
For example, the court mentioned the potential loss of a license to practice a
profession, to hold certain public offices, to remain employed as a teacher,
to have custody of children, to marry, to object to sterilization, to refuse
medical treatment, to possess a driver’s license, to own or possess firearms,
to remain registered to vote, and to enter into contracts.146 Although the
establishment of a conservatorship does not equate to a finding that the
conservatee is incompetent,147 nevertheless, conservators may be granted
the powers that are granted to the guardian of an incompetent person.148
The court also discussed the stigma that attaches when a conservatorship
is established for a gravely disabled individual. “There is compelling
evidence,” said the court, “that society still views the mentally ill with
suspicion.”149 A finding that the person is gravely disabled also seriously
threatens the conservatee’s reputation.150 A person labeled “gravely disabled”
by the state will, upon release from hospitalization, undoubtedly have
difficulty securing employment, obtaining admission to school, or even
meeting old acquaintances with the person’s reputation fully intact.151
The court then focused on three trial issues that strongly support a
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity as
constitutionally mandated standards in court proceedings to establish a
conservatorship. “‘Mental illness,”’ said the court, “is generally acknowledged
to be a vague and uncertain concept. Categories of mental diseases are
notoriously unclear, often overlap, and frequently change. The experts
themselves often disagree on what is an appropriate diagnosis.”152
Nevertheless, despite the fallibility of psychiatric testimony, judges and
juries, serving as factfinders in civil commitment and conservatorship

145. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 6.
146. Id. (citing statutes).
147. See Morris, supra note 93, at 220. LPS conservatorships, established under the
Welfare and Institutions Code, are merely one form of conservatorship. Id.; see also id.
at 208–15 (discussing the similarities and differences in guardianships and
conservatorships established through the California Probate Code and conservatorships
established through the California Welfare and Institutions Code). In Board of Regents
v. Davis, 533 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Cal. 1975), the California Supreme Court held that absent
a specific adjudication of incompetency, the imposition of a Probate Code conservatorship on
an individual does not deprive the conservatee of contractual capacity. As the court
stated, “[I]f a proposed conservatee is competent, no reason compels a total abolition of
his right to contract.” Id. at 1054.
148. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 5.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
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proceedings, typically defer to psychiatric judgments that the person has
a mental disorder and that the mental disorder meets the statutory
standard for commitment or a conservatorship.153 Exacerbating the
situation is “the paternalistic attitude of some appointed counsel”154 in
representing persons proposed for conservatorship. The court specifically
cited, and quoted from, the study conducted by my students and
published the year prior to the court’s decision.155
Obviously, the court was displeased with the failure of counsel for
proposed conservatees to vigorously oppose the deprivation of their
clients’ personal liberty and the loss of reputation that results from a
finding of grave disability and the appointment of a conservator. The
court cited approvingly a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court mandating minimum standards for attorneys in civil commitment
proceedings.156 “Those standards call for ‘adversary counsel’ who must
represent a client ‘zealously within the bounds of the law.’”157 By its
decision to impose the criminal due process protections of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity, the court was signaling to
attorneys that conservatorship proceedings are adversarial in nature—as
adversarial as are criminal prosecutions—and that the court would not
tolerate a paternalistic approach to the handling of these cases. The
notion that conservatorship proceedings are nonadversarial—that “we all
work together here”158 to do what is in the patient’s best medical
interest—was simply unacceptable. The patient’s attorney was expected
to actively challenge a psychiatrist’s opinion that a conservatorship was
warranted and not simply to passively acquiesce in that judgment.
153. Id. at 10 n.13, 11.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 11 n.17. Elsewhere in its opinion, the court cited studies reporting that
counsel appointed to represent proposed patients in civil commitment proceedings “tend
to play a paternalistic rather than an advocacy role.” Id. at 10 (citing Litwack, supra
note 37, at 827–31, and Andalman & Chambers, supra note 32). The court also cited an
empirical study of habeas corpus hearings conducted in California. Roulet, 590 P.2d at
10 (citing Warren, supra note 104, at 633). That study reported that the attorneys for the
patients “generally refrained from vigorous advocacy of their clients’ legal rights under
LPS.” Warren, supra note 104, at 633.
156. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 11 n.16 (citing and quoting State ex rel. Memmel v.
Mundy, 249 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. 1977)).
157. Id.
158. In a study of habeas corpus proceedings under LPS, Carol Warren reported: “A
phrase often used by all personnel in the court to refer to the nonadversary nature of the
proceedings was: ‘we all work together here.’” Warren, supra note 104, at 633. The phrase
seems equally applicable to the way conservatorship proceedings are processed under LPS.
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Five years after the California Supreme Court’s decision in Roulet, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the “vital importance”159 of
criminal defense counsel. According to the Court, ineffective assistance of
counsel “undermine[s] the proper functioning of the adversarial process [such]
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”160 Thus,
defense counsel’s “overriding mission [is] vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s
cause.”161 Because the loss of liberty and the imposition of disabilities are
as great or greater for conservatees than for prisoners, vigorous advocacy is
also the overriding mission of attorneys representing individuals subjected to
conservatorship proceedings in California. Recently, the California Court of
Appeal ruled that “a proposed conservatee has a statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel”162 and that such a right is protected by due process.163
The court added: “We see no meaningful distinction between criminal
and LPS proceedings insofar as the procedures required to guard against the
erroneous deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.”164
VI. MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN CONSERVATORSHIP
HEARINGS CONDUCTED IN 2007–2008
Conservatorship proceedings are conducted in San Diego County
Superior Court on Tuesday and Thursday mornings. Thus, in the period
commencing December 20, 2007, and ending March 27, 2008, proceedings
were conducted on twenty-eight days. On twenty-two days during that
period, law students who recently completed my course in Law and
Mental Disorder attended those sessions and recorded information about
those proceedings.165 Unlike the study conducted in 1975, the calendar
for conservatorship proceedings was divided into two parts. Cases that
were uncontested or in which the parties stipulated as to the results were
159. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
160. Id. at 686.
161. Id. at 689.
162. In re Conservatorship of David L., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 536 (Ct. App. 2008).
The court ruled that “[t]he duty of counsel to perform in an effective and professional
manner is implicit” in the statute providing for the appointment of the public defender or
other attorney for the proposed conservatee. Id. (interpreting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5365 (West 1998)).
163. David L., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 536.
164. Id. at 537.
165. I wish to thank the following students who volunteered to participate in this
study and to acknowledge their contribution to this study. The four students are: Michele
Brown, Joy Simon, Kevin Yee, and Douglas Wacker. I extend a special note of thanks
to Joy Simon who coordinated the court visits by the students and who attended significantly
more times than did other students. Students attended court on two of the three days that
court sessions were held in the month of December beginning on December 20, 2007;
nine of the nine sessions held in January 2008; five of the eight sessions held in February
2008; and six of the eight sessions held in March 2008.
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conducted first; contested cases were conducted subsequently. Each will
be discussed separately below. Table One indicates the number and type of
cases handled in the twenty-two sessions in which data were gathered
and the disposition of those cases.
TABLE ONE
Category

Total Number
of Cases

Disposition of Cases in
Each Category

Stipulated Cases

186

Uncontested Cases

52

Continuances

251

Terminations

13

Contested Cases to Establish
New Conservatorship
Contested Cases to Reestablish
Conservatorship
Rehearing on Issue of Grave
Disability
Contested Case to Establish
Conservatorship for Incompetent
Criminal Defendant
Totals for All
Decided Cases166

34

Conservatorship
reestablished in 186 cases
Conservatorship
established in 52 cases
Hearing postponed in
251 cases
Conservatorship
terminated in 13 cases
Conservatorship
established in 34 cases
Conservatorship
established in 12 cases
Conservatorship upheld
in 1 case
Conservatorship
established in 1 case

13
1
1

298

Conservatorships
established or
reestablished in 284
cases (95.3% of the total)

166. The total of 298 “decided” cases is composed of 52 cases in which new
conservatorships were established as uncontested matters, 186 cases in which conservatorships
were reestablished through stipulation, 13 cases in which conservatorships were terminated
without a hearing, 34 contested cases to establish new conservatorships, and 13 contested cases
to reestablish conservatorships. The total excludes the 251 cases in which continuances were
requested and were granted. Two other contested cases were not included in the total. In
one of those cases, an existing conservatorship was upheld after a rehearing to determine
whether the conservatee was gravely disabled. See infra text accompanying notes 213–14. In
the other case, a conservatorship was established for a criminal defendant who had been
found mentally incompetent to stand trial. See infra text accompanying note 215.
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A. Uncontested or Stipulated Cases
A total of fifty-two new conservatorships were established as
uncontested cases in the twenty-two court sessions, an average of 2.4
new conservatorships per session. The highest number of uncontested
new conservatorships established in any one session was six; the lowest
number in any one session was zero. A total of 186 conservatorships
were reestablished167 for an additional year through stipulation of the
parties, an average of 8.5 reestablished conservatorships per session.
The highest number of stipulated conservatorships reestablished for an
additional year in any one session was thirteen; the lowest number was
five. A total of eleven conservatorships were terminated by stipulation
of the parties, an average of 0.5 conservatorships per session. The
highest number of terminated conservatorships in any one session was
two; the lowest number was zero. Continuances were granted in a total
of 251 cases, an average of 11.4 per session. The highest number of
continuances in any one session was twenty; the lowest was one. The
total number of all cases handled in this portion of the court hearings
was 502 (including the granting of continuances), an average of 22.8
cases per session. If continuances are excluded, the total number of
cases in which a decision was made to establish a new conservatorship,
reestablish an existing conservatorship, or terminate a conservatorship
was 251, an average of 11.4 per session.
Although the patients’ attorneys in the 1975 study of conservatorship
hearings did not actively contest the finding of grave disability and the
appointment or reappointment of a conservator, the hearings that the
students observed that year were not characterized as uncontested or
stipulated cases. The development of this portion of the court’s
calendar—a significant portion, indeed—appears to have occurred since
that earlier study. How much time did the court devote to deciding these
cases? In the twenty-two court sessions, a total of 292 minutes—less
than five hours in all—was spent on the uncontested or stipulated cases,
an average of 13.3 minutes per session. The longest time spent in any
one session was twenty-nine minutes; the shortest was three minutes.
Think of it. A total of 502 cases were considered in 292 minutes. That
is an average time of 34.9 seconds spent on each case. Even if the
granting of continuances took no time at all, a total of 251 cases to
establish, reestablish, or terminate conservatorships were resolved in 292
167. An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates one year after the court
appoints a conservator. The conservator may petition the court to reestablish the
conservatorship and to be reappointed as conservator for a succeeding one-year period.
The same procedure is used to reestablish the conservatorship in subsequent years. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West 1998).
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minutes. That is an average time of one minute and 9.8 seconds spent on
each case.
The large number of continuances (251) is particularly disturbing. In
most cases, the request for a continuance was made by the Public
Defender who represented the proposed conservatee.168 The typical
reason given by the proposed conservatee’s attorney for requesting the
continuance was the need for further investigation. But why is more
time needed for such investigation? The conservatorship process is
initiated by the recommendation of a mental health professional at the
facility in which a patient is receiving treatment.169 Upon receiving the
recommendation, a conservatorship investigation officer—in San Diego
County, the Office of the Public Conservator is the investigative agency—
conducts an evaluation of the patient, and if the officer concurs in the
recommendation, petitions the court to establish a conservatorship.170 The
court is required by statute to appoint the Public Defender or another
attorney to represent the proposed conservatee within five days after the
date of the petition and to conduct a hearing within thirty days of the
date of the petition.171 If the proposed conservatee’s attorney is appointed
within five days after the petition, and the court hearing is conducted
three or more weeks later, the lawyer should have ample time to prepare
for the hearing. This seems especially true today when, as will be
discussed below, the proposed conservatee’s attorney conducts only a
168. E-mail from Leonard W. Pollard II, Senior Deputy County Counsel, County of
San Diego, to Grant H. Morris, Professor of Law (Sept. 8, 2008, 16:05:59 PDT) (on file
with author). In San Diego, Mr. Pollard, on behalf of the Office of County Counsel,
often represents the petitioner for the establishment of a conservatorship. Mr. Pollard
also reported: “However, sometimes, the Public Conservator court investigator requests a
continuance because the plan is not to ultimately establish the conservatorship because
the temporary conservatee is improving, but is not yet stable enough for discharge.” Id.
Such a practice is highly questionable. The Public Conservator, acting as conservatorship
investigator, is only permitted to petition the court to establish a conservatorship if the
Public Conservator determines that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998). Before petitioning for a conservatorship to be
established, the Public Conservator is required to “investigate all available alternatives to
conservatorship and [to] recommend conservatorship to the court only if no suitable
alternatives are available.” Id. § 5354. The Public Conservator should not be petitioning
for the establishment of a conservatorship, and extending the proposed conservatee’s
involuntary detention through a temporary conservatorship, in situations in which the
Public Conservator does not believe that a conservatorship is warranted and does not
intend to pursue its establishment.
169. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 5365.
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limited cross-examination of the psychiatrist who testifies at the hearing
in support of the conservatorship petition, does not seek the assistance of
a psychiatrist to evaluate the proposed conservatee or to testify on the
proposed conservatee’s behalf at the hearing, and does not offer the
testimony of a family member or any witness other than the proposed
conservatee at the hearing.172
Perhaps, it could be argued, that the request for a continuance can be
explained as an attempt to avoid the imposition of a conservatorship for
as long as possible. However, when the conservatorship investigation
officer petitions for conservatorship, the court, relying on the officer’s
report or the affidavit of the professional who recommended the
conservatorship, may issue an ex parte order establishing a temporary
conservatorship.173 The temporary conservator is statutorily authorized
to continue the patient’s detention in a mental treatment facility pending
the court hearing to determine whether a conservatorship should be
established.174 Although a temporary conservatorship terminates thirty
days after it is established, if the proposed conservatee demands a trial
on the issue of whether he or she is gravely disabled, the court may
extend the temporary conservatorship until that issue is decided.175 If a
conservatorship is established, the one-year duration of that conservatorship
does not include any time that the conservatee spent in a temporary
conservatorship.176
Similarly, if a one-year conservatorship has been established, the court
must notify the conservatee and the conservatee’s attorney at least sixty
days before the termination of the one-year period.177 A petition to
reestablish the conservatorship for an additional year must be filed at
least thirty days before the automatic termination date.178 The facility in
which the conservatee is detained is authorized to continue detaining the
conservatee after the termination date of the conservatorship if proceedings
to reestablish the conservatorship have not been completed and the court
orders the conservatee to be held there until the proceedings have been
completed.179 The statute that requires a hearing on a petition to establish a
conservatorship to be held within thirty days of the petition, and for the
172. See infra text accompanying notes 218–41 (discussing the performance of
counsel for proposed conservatees in contested hearings observed in this study).
173. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West 1998).
174. Id. § 5353.
175. Id. § 5352.1. The court, however, may not extend the temporary conservatorship
for a period exceeding six months. Id.
176. Id. § 5361.
177. Id. § 5362.
178. Id. § 5361. The statute provides that the conservator petitions the court to be
reappointed as conservator for a succeeding year. Id.
179. Id. § 5361.
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Public Defender or other attorney to be appointed within five days after
the date of the petition, applies as well to hearings on petitions to
reestablish conservatorships.180 Thus, an attorney representing a conservatee
is notified that the conservatorship is due to expire at least sixty days
before it expires. If a petition to reestablish the conservatorship is filed,
the attorney is notified three weeks or more before a hearing is
conducted on that petition.181 Requests for continuances premised on the
need to conduct further investigation should not be granted routinely by
the court. However, at least in San Diego County, they are.
Perhaps, it could be argued, that the request for a continuance can be
explained as a tactical decision by the proposed conservatee’s attorney to
delay the hearing until the client’s mental condition has improved such
that the client is a better—more rational—witness at the court hearing, or
the petition to establish or reestablish a conservatorship is terminated
without a hearing. Such a tactic seems unwarranted for two reasons.
First, the tactic requires the attorney to make a decision to subject the
client to continued involuntary confinement and continued involuntary
treatment until the hearing is held. The client’s important liberty interests
are sacrificed by the absence of a timely hearing to determine whether
such loss of liberty is warranted. An attorney’s ethical obligation to
advocate zealously for his or her client in a hearing to prevent such loss
is surely undermined by the attorney’s decision to request a continuance—
which allows such loss to occur without the hearing. Second, the tactic,
if used, is rarely successful. In the twenty-two days of hearings that my
students observed, 298 cases were resolved. Conservatorships were not
established or were terminated in only thirteen cases. Thus, conservatorships
were either established or reestablished in 95.6% of the cases studied,
whether or not a continuance was obtained to delay the hearing date.
The large number of uncontested cases involving the establishment of
conservatorships (fifty-two) and the even larger number of stipulated
cases involving the reestablishment of conservatorships (186) are
extremely problematic. The statute provides that the mental health
professional who recommends that a conservatorship be established
must first determine not only that the person is gravely disabled but that
he or she “is unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting, treatment
180. Id. § 5365.
181. See SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.32(B) (adopted July 1, 2006) (providing for a
hearing on a petition to reestablish a conservatorship to be calendared “to be heard no
less than 21 days nor more than 30 days from the date of filing of the written request”).
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voluntarily.”182 The conservatorship investigating officer may only petition
for a conservatorship to be established if the officer concurs with the
recommendation. If a person is unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily,
then how can that individual be willing to accept the establishment or
reestablishment of a conservatorship in which the court, in virtually every
case, abrogates his or her right to refuse treatment183 and authorizes the
conservator to impose treatment over the conservatee’s objection?184 And
if the person is incapable of accepting treatment voluntarily, then how
can that person be capable of voluntarily waiving the hearing at which
his or her incapacity to accept treatment voluntarily will be determined?
Stated theoretically, the capacity to evaluate the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to proposed therapy may differ from the capacity to waive a
hearing at which the person’s capacity to evaluate the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to proposed therapy is determined. But realistically, persons
whose mental disorders so affect their rational thought processes such
that they are incapable of deciding whether to accept treatment
voluntarily are also likely to be so severely mentally disordered as to be
incapable of competently waiving a hearing. At a minimum, the court should
conduct a careful examination of the proposed conservatee’s willingness and
capacity to waive a hearing to establish or reestablish a conservatorship.
In the hearings observed in this study, the judge did not perform the
analysis that is required. Rather, the judge simply accepted the two or
three sentence explanation offered by the proposed conservatee’s
attorney for why the case was not contested. Typically, the attorney
would merely state that he or she met with the proposed conservatee,
that the proposed conservatee understands the nature of the conservatorship
and the treatment, does not want to come to court, and does not object to
the Public Defender appearing on the proposed conservatee’s behalf.
Sometimes the attorney would offer a seemingly opposite reason for not
contesting the proposed conservatorship. For example, in one case, the
attorney testified that the client lacked insight and could not understand
the situation. In others, the attorney testified that the client was decompensating
and was uncontrollable or that the client was agitated and not directable.
Sometimes, the attorney reported the client’s ambivalence toward the
proceeding: “She didn’t want to be on a conservatorship but knew she
182. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998).
183. See id. § 5357 (providing that the conservatorship investigating officer’s report
shall recommend for or against the imposition of various disabilities on the proposed
conservatee, including “[t]he right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to
the conservatee’s being gravely disabled”).
184. Id. § 5358(b) (“A conservator shall also have the right, if specified in the court
order, to require his or her conservatee to receive treatment related specifically to
remedying . . . the conservatee’s being gravely disabled . . . .”).
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needed help.” In all cases, the court accepted the attorney’s explanation
and decided the matter without further inquiry.
Perhaps the failure of the court to distinguish between these different
situations can be explained by a San Diego Superior Court rule that
allows the court to proceed in the absence of the client if the attorney
who requests the court to waive the client’s presence represents that the
attorney has been in contact with the client and “that, in the attorney’s
opinion, it is not in the best interests of the conservatee-client to be
present in court or for the court to convene where the conservatee is then
housed.”185 The rule places the attorney in the untenable position of
reporting to the court the attorney’s assessment of the client’s best
interests in a situation in which the client’s best interests, as assessed by
the client’s attorney, conflict with the client’s legal right to oppose the
establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship and also conflict
with the attorney’s obligation to assist the client in asserting that right.
In discussing the proposed conservatee’s right to a court hearing on the
issues of placement, disabilities to be imposed on the conservatee, and
the powers of the conservator, the California Court of Appeal noted that
the proposed conservatee’s attorney is charged with “protect[ing] the
client’s rights and achiev[ing] the client’s fundamental goals.”186 The
court added, “[T]he attorney may not, without the consent of his or her
client, enter into an agreement that ‘impair[s] the client’s substantial
rights or the cause of action itself.’”187 The San Diego County Superior Court
rule, which deviates from the court of appeal’s decision, should be repealed.
Several California Court of Appeal cases, originating in San Diego
County, have considered the circumstances under which counsel for a
proposed conservatee may communicate his or her client’s waiver of the
right to be present at the hearing to establish a conservatorship. For
example, in Conservatorship of Moore, the court held that because
conservatees are not automatically considered incompetent, their ability
to knowingly and intelligently waive their right to a hearing on a petition
185. SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.13 (adopted July 1, 2006).
186. In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 (Ct. App.
2006) (quoting Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 764 (Cal. 1969)). Although Linsk was a
divorce case, the case was quoted by the California Court of Appeal in Christopher A. as
authority for expressing the proper role of attorneys litigating conservatorship cases.
187. Id. (quoting, in part, Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1969)). In 2007,
the California Court of Appeal reiterated its Christopher A. decision by including the
quotations from Christopher A. in In re Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382,
388 (Ct. App. 2007).
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for reestablishment of the conservatorship is a question of fact.188 The
proposed conservatee’s attorney is required to contact the client, ascertain
whether the client wants a hearing to oppose the reestablishment, and
directly communicate the client’s decision to the court through a sworn
affidavit.189 The court assumed that the client’s voluntary and intelligent
waiver of rights can be inferred when the attorney is present in court.190
Upon the waiver of a hearing, the trial court may act on its own motion
and grant the reestablishment petition ex parte.191
In Moore, the court of appeal asserted that even if the trial court erred
in reestablishing the conservatorship, the conservatee’s loss of liberty
would be de minimus because the conservatee can challenge the
reestablishment through a statutory provision that allows the conservatee
to petition the court for a rehearing as to his or her status as a
conservatee or through a writ of habeas corpus.192 However, the court
failed to consider that the conservatee bears the burden of proof in a
rehearing on the conservatee’s status and in a habeas corpus hearing.193
For a conservatee who bears the burden of establishing that he or she is
not gravely disabled, the potential for a loss of liberty is surely greater
than that for a conservatee who the petitioner must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to be gravely disabled. The two proceedings cannot
be equated.
In 2006, the California Court of Appeal held that in considering a
petition to establish a conservatorship, the trial court, before accepting a
stipulated judgment on placement of the conservatee, on disabilities to
be imposed on the conservatee, and on powers of the conservator, “must
consult with the conservatee to instruct him or her on the consequences
of the stipulation and obtain the conservatee’s express consent to the
188. 229 Cal. Rptr. 875, 884 (Ct. App. 1986).
189. Id. at 882.
190. Id. at 884 (quoting Conservatorship of Chambers, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Ct.
App. 1977)).
191. Id. at 883 (holding that when the conservatee chooses not to contest the
proceeding, the ex parte reestablishment of the conservatorship “offends neither the state
nor federal constitutional requirements for due process”).
192. Id. at 882. The court cited CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998),
which authorizes a conservatee to petition for a rehearing as to his or her status as a
conservatee. The court also cited CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West 1998), which
merely authorizes a conservatee to request a court hearing to contest a petition to
reestablish a conservatorship. The court failed to explain why this statute remains
available to a conservatee after the trial court has already waived the hearing at the
request of the conservatee’s attorney and has ordered the conservatorship reestablished
through its ex parte decision.
193. In a rehearing on the conservatee’s status, conducted pursuant to CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998), SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 8.2.22(A) (adopted July 1, 2006)
specifically places the burden of proof upon the conservatee to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the conservatee is no longer gravely disabled.
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stipulation on those issues.”194 Less than one year later, that same court
held that in considering a petition to reestablish a conservatorship, the
trial court may reestablish the conservatorship without a court hearing,
relying upon the sworn statement of the attorney that the client
knowingly and willingly consented to the reestablishment of the
conservatorship by stipulation and without a formal court hearing.195
The form signed by the attorney did not contain any indication that the
issues of placement of the conservatee or disabilities to be imposed on
the conservatee had been discussed with the client, and the attorney did
not represent that she spoke to her client about those issues and that the
conservatee had agreed to the proposed placement and the imposition of
disabilities.196 Unlike the case involving the establishment of a
conservatorship, here the court of appeal did not require the trial court to
consult with the conservatee to instruct her on the consequences of
stipulating to the reestablishment and to obtain the conservatee’s express
consent to the stipulation on those consequences. The court simply
assumed that when the attorney indicated on the form that she “discussed
reestablishment” with the client, the attorney presumably discussed the
issues of placement and disabilities because, in the court’s words, those
issues are “central to reestablishment.”197 Thus, for reestablishment of a
conservatorship, there is no requirement that the trial court consult with
the conservatee to instruct the conservatee on the consequences of
stipulating and obtain the conservatee’s express consent to the stipulation,
and there is no requirement that the trial court inquire of the attorney as
to what was discussed with the client when the attorney swears that the
attorney “discussed reestablishment” of the conservatorship with the client.
The distinction is untenable. A statute provides that a conservatorship
“shall automatically terminate one year after the appointment of the
conservator by the superior court.”198 Thus, a petition to reestablish a
conservatorship is not a petition to continue an existing conservatorship.
Rather, it is a petition to establish a new conservatorship when the existing
conservatorship terminates. The court’s obligations to consult with the
194. In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 (Ct. App.
2006).
195. In re Conservatorship of Tian L., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 384 (Ct. App. 2007).
196. Id. at 387. The court simply acknowledged that “the form could be improved
by including a space to . . . show those issues were discussed and the conservatee agreed
to their imposition without a hearing.” Id.
197. Id. at 387–88.
198. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998).
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proposed conservatee to fully inform him or her of the consequences of a
conservatorship, including placement and disabilities, and to obtain
the proposed conservatee’s competent waiver of a hearing, should be
identical for both proceedings. After all, a proposed conservatee faces
the same potential loss of liberty and stigmatization whether the
proceeding is to establish a new conservatorship or to reestablish a
conservatorship that is about to expire.199
Recently, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the decision
in In re Conservatorship of John L.,200 a case from San Diego County
decided by the California Court of Appeal.201 In John L., the appellate
court ruled that in a reestablishment proceeding, the trial court may rely
upon the unsworn representation of the proposed conservatee’s counsel
that the client’s waiver of a hearing was knowing and intelligent.202 If
the John L. decision is affirmed, the trial court will not be obligated to
conduct its own evaluation to ensure that the proposed conservatee
understands the consequences of a conservatorship and that the
conservatee made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a court hearing.
If this decision is affirmed, the trial court will not even be required to
obtain a sworn statement from the proposed conservatee’s attorney that
the attorney fully informed the proposed conservatee of the consequences of
a conservatorship, including placement and disabilities, and that the
proposed conservatee made a knowing and competent waiver of a hearing.
In reaching its judgment, the court of appeal asserted that the cost of
implementing a proposed safeguard of unwaivable mandatory presence
of the proposed conservatee in court outweighed the additional protection
accorded to the proposed conservatee “particularly given the presence of
counsel, who we presume to be competent.”203 But can the attorney’s
199. It should be noted, however, that the very next statute distinguishes the
establishment of new conservatorships from the reestablishment of conservatorships by
requiring a court hearing or a jury trial on the reestablishment only if requested by the
conservatee or the conservatee’s attorney. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5362 (West
1998). For new conservatorships, a court hearing occurs without such request, unless the
hearing is waived by the conservatee. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1) (West
1998). If a petition to reestablish a conservatorship is not a petition to continue an
existing conservatorship, but rather, is a petition to establish a new conservatorship when
the existing conservatorship terminates, then section 5362 should be amended to equate
the proceedings by eliminating the requirement of a request for a court hearing or jury
trial in conservatorship reestablishment proceedings.
200. 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007).
201. In re Conservatorship of John L., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (Ct. App. 2007), review
granted and opinion superseded by 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007). The California Court of
Appeal decision may not be cited.
202. Id. at 408. The court stated, “[H]ere, counsel represented to the court that John
had consented to his conservatorship and elected to waive his presence at the hearing.”
Id. at 409.
203. Id. at 407.
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competence be presumed? The large number of conservatorships
reestablished through stipulation of counsel—186 cases in this study of
twenty-two court sessions—and the insignificant amount of time spent
to decide those cases—one minute and 9.8 seconds per case—strongly
suggests that trial courts are not devoting the attention to conservatorship
reestablishment cases that those cases properly deserve.204 In the John
L. case, for example, the conservatorship investigator’s report indicated
that the investigator had met with John, and that “he ‘made it clear that
he did not want a Conservator and thought that he did not need any
assistance.’”205 At the hearing conducted one month and one day after the
investigator met with John, John’s attorney stated, “When we met[,
John] indicated that at this time he was not contesting the conservatorship.
He did not want to be present in court. So we would ask the court to
excuse his presence.”206 The trial judge immediately responded, “His
presence is excused.”207 John’s lawyer offered no explanation of why
John’s attitude toward the conservatorship had changed, and the judge
asked for none. John’s lawyer then stipulated to the admission of the
medical report and the conservatorship investigator’s report, and the trial
court ordered the conservatorship reestablished.208
In her petition to the California Supreme Court for review of the court
of appeal decision, John’s appellate attorney noted that judges are
tempted to proceed as did the trial court in John’s case “because it was
expeditious—the entire case was concluded in less than a minute or
two.”209 However, the attorney aptly observed, “But the conveyor-belt
aura of the proceedings does not inspire confidence that John’s rights were
adequately protected, given the conflicting evidence regarding his wishes.”210
Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will use the John L. case to
slow the conveyor belt, if not disengage it completely. Although the
204. By way of comparison, only fifty-two new conservatorships were established
in uncontested cases. Consider also that in the twenty-two court sessions, only thirteen
cases for reestablishment of conservatorships were contested cases, compared with thirtyfour contested cases involving new conservatorships. Thus, in this study, stipulation of
reestablishment of conservatorship occurred in 93.4% of the cases, compared with 60.5%
of new conservatorships. See supra Table One.
205. John L., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 397.
206. Id. at 397–98.
207. Id. at 398.
208. Id.
209. Petition for Review at *18, Conservatorship of John L., No. D048654, 2007
WL 3265719 (Cal. Oct. 10, 2007), review granted, 172 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2007).
210. Id.
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court could decide the case on the narrow issue of whether the trial court
may rely upon the attorney’s unsworn representation of the client’s
waiver of the right to a hearing, a broader consideration of the duties of
the proposed conservatee’s counsel and of the trial court is surely
warranted. Stated simply, due process is not trumped by a desire to
handle cases expeditiously. As the California Supreme Court declared
in Conservatorship of Roulet, “The easier the path to commitment, the
more likely becomes the possibility of mistake.”211 In order to counteract
potentially erroneous decisions to deprive proposed conservatees of their
liberty and to inflict stigma upon them, the Roulet court imposed
criminal process safeguards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury
unanimity in proceedings to establish or reestablish conservatorships.212
The possibility of an erroneous decision remains high when an attorney
reports that his or her client waives the due process right to be present at
the hearing and either does not contest the establishment of a new
conservatorship or stipulates to the reestablishment of a conservatorship. Did
the attorney inform the client of the disabilities that could be imposed on
him or her and that the conservatee was likely to be placed in a mental
treatment facility where treatment would be imposed over the client’s
objection? Did the attorney consciously or subconsciously discourage
the client from attending the hearing because the attorney believed the
client would not succeed in the hearing and that it was not in the client’s
best interests to attend? If the client makes a competent, voluntary, and
informed decision to waive the hearing and acquiesces in the establishment
or reestablishment of a conservatorship, then is the client agreeing to
accept treatment voluntarily, in which case the establishment or
reestablishment of a conservatorship is unnecessary and an inappropriate
involuntary commitment? The trial court needs to consider and answer
these questions, not avoid them in the quest for expediency.
B. Contested Cases
A total of thirty-four new conservatorships were established in
contested cases in the twenty-two court sessions, an average of 1.5 new
conservatorships per session. The highest number of new conservatorships
established in contested cases in any one session was four; the lowest
number in any one session was zero. A total of twelve conservatorships
were reestablished for an additional year in contested cases in the

211. 590 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1979).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 140–58. The Roulet case involved a
proceeding to reestablish a conservatorship. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 2. The court applied its
due process safeguards to all conservatorship proceedings. Id. at 11.
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twenty-two court sessions, an average of 0.5 reestablished conservatorships
per session. The highest number of conservatorships reestablished in
contested cases in any one session was two; the lowest number in any
one session was zero. In one contested case, the court ruled that the
conservatorship would not be reestablished. This case was the only one
of a total of forty-seven contested cases observed in this study in which
the court ruled against the establishment or reestablishment of a
conservatorship. Thus, conservatorships were established or reestablished
in 97.9% of all contested cases.
Two other matters were considered as contested cases. In one case, a
conservatee petitioned the court for a rehearing as to his status as a
conservatee.213 In this rehearing, the court held that the conservatee
remained gravely disabled and that the conservatorship would be continued.
However, the court also ruled that the least restrictive placement for the
patient was a board and care facility instead of a closed, locked facility
where the conservatee had been housed previously.214 Because this case
did not involve the establishment of a new conservatorship or the
reestablishment of a conservatorship that was about to expire, this case
was not included in the study data. The second case involved the
establishment of a conservatorship for a criminal defendant who had
been charged with a serious felony and found permanently incompetent
to stand trial. In 1974, the California Legislature enacted legislation that
added an alternative definition of “gravely disabled” to enable a
conservatorship to be established for such an individual.215 Because a

213. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West 1998) (authorizing a conservatee
to petition the superior court for a rehearing on the conservatee’s status). Although the
conservatee may petition the court for a rehearing at any time, if the conservatee is
unsuccessful in the rehearing, the conservatee is not permitted to petition the court again
for a period of six months. Id. In a rehearing on the conservatee’s status, SAN DIEGO
SUP. CT. R. 8.2.22(A) (adopted July 1, 2006) specifically places the burden of proof upon
the conservatee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conservatee is
no longer gravely disabled. See supra text accompanying notes 192–93.
214. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(A) (West 1998) (requiring the
court to designate the least restrictive alternative placement for a conservatee).
215. Act of Sept. 26, 1974, ch. 1511, § 12, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3316, 3322. As
renumbered, and with some minor technical amendments, the statute has been codified at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(B) (West 1998). The California Supreme Court
has upheld the validity of this legislation. Conservatorship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836
(Cal. 1980). But see Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The
Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 26–32 (1993) (strongly critiquing the 1974 legislation and the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Hofferber).
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finding of grave disability for a permanently incompetent criminal
defendant is not dependent upon proof of a functional inability to
provide for food, clothing, and shelter, this case was not included in the
study data.
In the twenty-two court sessions, a total of 1046 minutes—17.4
hours—was spent on contested cases—an average of forty-eight minutes
per session and 22.3 minutes per contested case.216 The longest hearing
lasted forty-four minutes; the shortest lasted seven minutes. The thirtyfour hearings to establish new conservatorships averaged 23.7 minutes
per hearing, just over five minutes longer than the 18.5 minute average
duration of the thirteen hearings to reestablish conservatorships.217
Because the average duration of contested hearings in the 2007–2008
study—22.3 minutes per case—is substantially longer than the average
duration of contested hearings in the 1975 study—less than three minutes
per case218—one might suppose that the quality of attorney representation
of proposed conservatees today has improved significantly. However, a
closer examination of the cases suggests that such supposition is
unfounded.
In the typical contested case involving the establishment of a new
conservatorship, County Counsel, acting on behalf of the petitioner,
introduced into evidence the Public Conservator’s report recommending
that a new conservatorship be established. In the typical contested case
involving the reestablishment of a conservatorship, County Counsel,
acting on behalf of the petitioner, introduced into evidence the petition
of the conservator, which included the opinion of two physicians or
psychologists that the conservatee was still gravely disabled.219 In addition,
in all cases, County Counsel introduced into evidence the testimony of a
psychiatrist—either the patient’s treating doctor or a psychiatrist from
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic of the San Diego County Superior Court
who examined the proposed conservatee prior to the hearing.
In forty-three of the forty-seven cases studied, the Public Defender,
who represented the proposed conservatee in all forty-seven cases,
introduced into evidence the testimony of the proposed conservatee. In
none of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender request an
evaluation of the proposed conservatee by another psychiatrist. In none
216. A total of 806 minutes was devoted to the thirty-four cases to establish a new
conservatorship. A total of 240 minutes was devoted to the thirteen cases to reestablish a
conservatorship.
217. Both the longest hearing (forty-four minutes) and the shortest hearing (seven
minutes) involved hearings to establish new conservatorships. The longest hearing to
reestablish a conservatorship was forty minutes; the shortest was nine minutes.
218. See supra text accompanying note 136.
219. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1998).
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of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender request that the
court appoint a psychiatrist to assist him or her in preparing for or
conducting the hearing. In none of the forty-seven case studied did the
Public Defender offer the testimony of a psychiatrist to controvert the
expert opinion of the psychiatrist who testified for the petitioner. In only
one of the forty-seven cases studied did the Public Defender offer the
testimony of a family member or any other witness to support the
proposed conservatee’s testimony that the conservatee was not gravely
disabled and that a conservatorship was inappropriate. In fact, in one
case, the mother of the proposed conservatee interrupted the hearing,
stating to the judge that she wanted the proposed conservatee to live with
her. The judge asked the Public Defender whether she wanted to speak
to the mother. The Public Defender stated that she did not wish to do so,
but that if the judge required her to, she would. The judge stated that she
would not require the attorney to speak with her. After this exchange,
the judge allowed County Counsel to recall the psychiatrist who had
previously testified that the proposed conservatee was gravely disabled.
The psychiatrist stated that if the mother would take care of the proposed
conservatee, then the proposed conservatee would not meet the standard
of grave disability. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ruled that
the proposed conservatee was gravely disabled and that a conservatorship
would be established.
Thus, in the typical case, the only witnesses were the psychiatrist who
examined or treated the proposed conservatee and who testified that the
proposed conservatee was mentally disordered and met the criteria for
grave disability, and the proposed conservatee, who testified that he or
she was not mentally disordered or, if mentally disordered, did not meet
the criteria for grave disability. Although the Public Defender usually
asked a few questions of the psychiatrist on cross-examination, the
questions characteristically did not probe for significant weaknesses in
the psychiatrist’s stated opinion, but rather, merely permitted the
psychiatrist to restate his or her conclusion and to clarify or embellish
upon the reasons for the psychiatrist’s judgment.
Dr. Ansar Haroun, Supervisor of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic,
acknowledged that a psychiatrist’s opinion that a proposed conservatee
is gravely disabled should be easily challengeable on cross-examination.220

220. Interview with Ansar M. Haroun, M.D., Supervisor, Forensic Psychiatry Clinic
of the San Diego County Superior Court, in San Diego, Cal. (May 29, 2008).
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If a person has a normal ability to provide for food, clothing, and shelter,
that person is able to provide for his or her basic needs. If the person has
difficulties in providing for those needs because of a mental disorder, that
person is disabled. Often, Dr. Haroun asserted, psychiatrists will conclude
that the person is gravely disabled if the impairment in providing for
basic necessities is severe. However, to meet the statutory definition of
“grave disability,” the person, as a result of mental disorder, must be
unable to provide for food, clothing, or shelter.221 Inability to provide
for basic needs means more than experiencing difficulty in providing for
them. If the statutory standard of “grave disability” is literally applied
by the court, a person who is not on the verge of starving to death even
if the person eats out of a trash can, who has at least some clothes to
wear no matter how tattered and dirty their condition, and who knows
enough to get out of the rain even if the person is homeless, should not
be found to be gravely disabled. Nevertheless, psychiatrists will express
their opinion that a person is gravely disabled even if he or she is not
unable to provide for food, clothing, and shelter, and lawyers for proposed
conservatees do not challenge those opinions on cross-examination.
Because, in the typical case, the judge only heard the testimony of the
psychiatrist—with no effective cross-examination by the Public
Defender—and the testimony of the proposed conservatee, the results of
the hearings could easily be anticipated. In forty-six of the forty-seven
contested cases—97.9% of the cases studied—the court ruled in favor of
the petitioner and ordered that the conservatorship be established or
reestablished.222
In the hearings, the Public Defender rarely questioned whether
disabilities223 should be imposed on the proposed conservatee if the
court should decide to order that a conservatorship be established or
reestablished. In only three of the forty-seven cases did the Public Defender
challenge either the potential loss of the proposed conservatee’s
privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle or the
proposed conservatee’s right to refuse or consent to routine medical
treatment unrelated to the person’s condition of grave disability. In only
two of the forty-seven cases did the Public Defender challenge the

221. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998).
222. In the one case in which the judge ruled that a conservatorship would not be
reestablished, the individual testified that he currently takes his medication because it
makes him feel better and improves his sleep and his mood, and that he attends a day
program and will continue to attend that program to help him in dealing with problems
he has with his mental illness. The patient also submitted a letter outlining his housing
arrangements and future plans.
223. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West 1998) (identifying the disabilities
that can be imposed on a conservatee).
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potential loss of the proposed conservatee’s right to enter into contracts,
the potential conservatee’s right to vote, or the proposed conservatee’s
right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to the
proposed conservatee’s condition of grave disability. In none of the
forty-seven cases did the Public Defender challenge the potential loss of
the proposed conservatee’s right to possess a firearm.
In all forty-six cases in which a conservatorship was established or
reestablished—100% of the cases—the court imposed all of the
following disabilities on the conservatee: loss of driver’s license, loss of
the right to enter into contracts, loss of the right to refuse or consent to
treatment related specifically to the conservatee’s condition of grave
disability, loss of the right to refuse or consent to routine medical
treatment unrelated to the person’s condition of grave disability, and loss
of the proposed conservatee’s right to possess a firearm. In sharp
contrast, the court disqualified the conservatee from voting in only three
of the forty-six cases—only 6.5% of the cases in which a conservatorship
was established. Typically, the testifying psychiatrist would simply state
that the conservatee was able to complete a voter registration form or
could identify the President and thus should not be disqualified from
voting. Dr. Haroun informed me that his predecessor as Supervisor of
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic had expressed concern that efforts to
disqualify conservatees from voting might be challenged by the American
Civil Liberties Union, and that to avoid such potential litigation,
psychiatrists working in the Forensic Clinic should not seek to impose
this disability.224 This informal policy continues to be employed. Thus,
psychiatrists in the Forensic Clinic typically seek to have all statutory
disabilities imposed except disqualification from voting, and the court
typically imposes all disabilities except disqualification from voting.
This disparity suggests that individual cases are not being separately
considered on their merits, but rather, are processed as a routine matter
with anticipated, if not predetermined, results.
The failure of the Public Defender to advocate effectively that the
proposed conservatee should be permitted to retain various rights surely
contributed to the court’s decision to remove those rights when the
conservatorship was established or reestablished. The unchallenged loss
of the conservatee’s right to refuse or consent to treatment related to the

224. Interview with Ansar M. Haroun, M.D., Supervisor, Forensic Psychiatry Clinic
of the San Diego County Superior Court, in San Diego, Cal. (May 29, 2008).
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conservatee’s condition of grave disability is especially troubling. A
judge’s decision that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled and
that a conservatorship be established or reestablished is not, in and of
itself, an adjudication that the conservatee is mentally incompetent
generally or lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions.225 The court
is required to “mak[e] appropriate findings” in order to deny the conservatee
the right to give or withhold consent to treatment for the conservatee’s
condition.226 Substantial evidence of a conservatee’s competence to
make treatment decisions may be available in some, and perhaps many,
cases. For example, in a study of mental patient decisionmaking, the
most frequently cited reason by patients for refusing medication was side
effects experienced from previous administration of that medication.227
Psychotropic medications are powerful drugs that may produce
temporary and permanent side effects that are discomforting,228 painful,229
disabling,230 and even deadly.231 Even the newer atypical antipsychotic
medications, such as Clozaril, Resperidal, and Zyprexa, increase a patient’s

225. See supra text accompanying notes 120–21.
226. Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (Ct. App.
1987).
227. Morris, supra note 107, at 404.
228. Sedation is a common non-neurological side effect of psychotropic medication.
Sedated patients experience drowsiness and fatigue. Cichon, supra note 63, at 297.
Other non-neurological side effects include anticholinergic disturbances such as blurred
vision, dry mouth, urinary retention, and constipation. Id. at 297–98.
229. Akathisia is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication. Akathisia
“is characterized by a painful irritability and a persistent desire to move. Symptoms can
include a constant tapping of feet, alteration of posture and shifting of legs, fidgeting,
pacing, and an inability to feel comfortable in any position.” Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
Dystonias are another extrapyramidal side effect. “Dystonic reactions often involve
acute and very painful spasms of muscle groups including those in the neck, face, eyes,
pelvis, trunk, and the extremities.” Id. at 303.
230. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of psychotropic medication that is
characterized by “uncontrollable repetitive movements principally affecting the face,
tongue, mouth, trunk (including respiratory muscles), upper and lower extremities, neck,
shoulders, and pelvis. In the more pronounced cases, patients may have difficulty in
swallowing (resulting in weight loss), talking, and breathing . . . .” Id. at 304. Parkinsonism
is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication. “Its symptoms include a
mask-like face, tremors of the limbs, muscle rigidity, spasms, drooling, a stooped and
shuffling gait, and a general slowing of motor responses.” Id. at 300. Akinesia is a
subcategory of Parkinsonism, “characterized by a decrease in spontaneous mobility and
speech along with a general feeling of listlessness and apathy.” Id. at 301. Other
disabling side effects include obstructed vision, blindness, and sexual dysfunction. Id. at
298, 303.
231. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a side effect of psychotropic medication.
Its symptoms include “hyperthermia (fever), severe skeletal rigidity, elevated blood
pressure, tachycardia, and alterations in consciousness including delirium, mutism,
stupor, and coma. . . . This disorder is fatal in twenty to thirty percent of the cases . . . .”
Id. at 308 (citation omitted). Dyscrasias are potentially fatal blood disorders that may
occur as side effects of psychotropic medication. Id. at 298–99.
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risk of diabetes, obesity, and heart disease. 232 Although competent
decisionmaking requires the individual to weigh the potential benefits of
a proposed medication as well as the risks, nevertheless, a patient’s
concern about side effects—particularly if those side effects have been
experienced previously—may be a rational basis for that patient to
refuse administration of that medication. Some treating psychiatrists,
however, do not consider mental patients’ concerns about side effects in
assessing their competence to refuse medication. When psychiatrists
make a professional judgment that a medication is medically appropriate
to treat the patient’s disorder, they often view any patient objections as
irrational.233
Additionally, many psychiatrists do not provide mental patients with
needed information about medication side effects and treatment alternatives
to the medication they are prescribing.234 One study reported that the failure
of psychiatrists to inform patients was not limited to a few isolated
incidents, but rather, was pervasive.235 When psychiatrists withhold or
otherwise manipulate236 information about risks and alternatives, they

232. Consensus Development Conference on Antipsychotic Drugs and Obesity and
Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 596, 597–98, 600 (2004). Participants in the conference
included the American Diabetes Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
North American Association for the Study of Obesity, and the American Association of
Clinical Endocrinologists. Id. at 596.
233. Similarly, psychiatrists are also too quick to claim that a patient’s denial that
he or she has a mental disorder determines the patient’s incapacity to make treatment
decisions. Sometimes a patient’s seemingly irrational objections to medication are, in
fact, rationally based. For example, does the patient who appears to deny a mental
disorder acknowledge in nonmedical terms that the patient is experiencing a problem? Is
the patient denying mental disorder in order to maintain control over his or her life and to
avoid being thrust into the dependent role of a mental patient? Is the patient denying
mental disorder because the patient has experienced medication side effects previously
and is more concerned about those effects than the therapeutic potential of the
medication? Is the denial an attempt to avoid a catch-22 situation, that is, by admitting
mental disorder the patient strengthens the psychiatrist’s assertion that medication is the
appropriate remedy? Is the patient’s hostility toward the psychiatrist a rational reaction
either to the patient’s involuntary detention or to the lack of communication between the
psychiatrist and the patient?
234. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 107, at 425–29.
235. Id. at 429.
236. Examples of manipulation include informing patients only about medication
benefits; or discussing risks only in general terms, informing patients only that any
medication can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects; or discussing some lesser,
non-neurological side effects, such as sedation, dry mouth, blurred vision, urinary
retention, and constipation, but omitting any discussion of neurological side effects such
as dystonia, Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and tardive dyskinesia. Id. at 426–27.
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undermine their patients’ abilities to make competent decisions.237
To obtain a competent patient’s informed consent, the California Supreme
Court requires doctors to divulge “all information relevant to a meaningful
decisional process.”238 Psychiatrists should not be allowed to circumvent
their disclosure obligation by asserting that whenever a patient refuses
prescribed medication, that patient lacks the capacity to make treatment
decisions.
In the hearings observed in this study, the psychiatrist’s judgment that
the proposed conservatee should lose the right to make treatment
decisions regarding the proposed conservatee’s mental disorder was not
challenged by the Public Defender. Was the patient refusing medication
because of a rational concern about side effects? Did the psychiatrist
fulfill the psychiatrist’s disclosure obligation to fully inform the patient
about side effects that may be experienced? These issues were not
addressed in cross-examination. They should have been.
The failure of the Public Defender to contest the imposition of the
treatment decisionmaking disability on his or her client cannot be
justified. The deprivation of liberty that occurs when that right is lost is
truly significant. In all forty-six cases in which the court abrogated the
conservatee’s right to make treatment decisions, the court transferred
that decisionmaking authority to the conservator.239 In all forty-six cases,
the court specifically granted the conservator the authority to place the
conservatee in a mental hospital or other treatment facility240 and to
require the conservatee to receive treatment for his or her mental disorder.241
From the conservatee’s perspective, the government’s unwanted assistance

237. John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 129, 132 (1991); see also Loren
H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface,
35 EMORY L.J. 139, 143 (1986) (“Information is given to patients largely to achieve their
compliance, not to involve the patient in decision making.”). To make a competent
decision, a patient must analyze relevant information in terms of the patient’s own knowledge,
beliefs, and goals. Carroll, supra, at 132.
238. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972). The court summarized the physician’s
disclosure duty as follows:
In sum, the patient’s right of self-decision is the measure of the physician’s
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses
adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need,
and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the test
for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to
the patient’s decision.
Id. at 11.
239. In only eight of the forty-six cases did the Public Defender challenge the transfer of
the conservatee’s treatment decisionmaking authority to the conservator.
240. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1), (2) (West 1998).
241. Id. § 5358(b).
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resulted in the conservatee’s involuntary confinement and coerced
treatment.
VII. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY FOR MENTALLY DISORDERED CLIENTS:
REALITY OR DELUSION?
In 1979, the California Supreme Court imposed a requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in proceedings to establish
mental health conservatorships.242 The court did so, in part, because
of “the paternalistic attitude of some appointed counsel”243 in representing
proposed conservatees. Despite the court’s decision, the recent study of
attorney performance in conservatorship cases reveals that the paternalistic
attitude of counsel representing proposed conservatees has not changed.
Paternalism existed thirty years ago; paternalism persists today.
In the article reporting on the 1975 study of conservatorship hearings
in San Diego County, I recommended that instead of “using large
numbers of private practitioners who handle conservatorship cases only
sporadically, consideration should be given to creating a full-time
conservatee attorney service.”244 I cited approvingly the public defender
model employing a small group of attorneys who would develop expertise
in preparing and presenting cases and who would “pursue those cases
with appropriate dedication.”245 But I was wrong.246 Although a small
group of attorneys from the Office of the Public Defender now represents
proposed conservatees in conservatorship hearings in San Diego County,
the recent study reveals that cases are not pursued by those attorneys
with appropriate dedication. Although replacing occasional counsel
with organized and regularized counsel is an important prerequisite to
adequate representation of mentally disordered clients, such reform does

242. Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 140–58 (discussing Roulet).
243. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 11.
244. Morris, supra note 93, at 237.
245. Id.
246. In defense of my proposal, I note that I included in my recommendation that
this small group of attorneys representing proposed conservatees would “have adequate
psychiatric and social work services to assist them.” Id. The attorneys from the Office
of the Public Defender who represent proposed conservatees in San Diego County do not
have, and have not requested, that needed assistance.
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not ensure that paternalism will be replaced with zealous advocacy.247
What is needed is a change in attitude.
When the government seeks to civilly commit a mentally disordered
individual, the role of the attorney is to zealously advocate for that
individual in an attempt to prevent the loss of the client’s liberty. After
all, detention of the individual through civil commitment is an involuntary
detention. When the government seeks to determine that the mentally
disordered individual is incapable of making treatment decisions regarding
his or her disorder, the role of the attorney is to zealously advocate for that
individual in an attempt to prevent the loss of the client’s right to make
autonomous treatment decisions. After all, treatment of the individual
without his or her consent is involuntary treatment. When the government
seeks to establish a conservatorship for a mentally disordered individual
in order to empower a conservator to place the conservatee in a mental
hospital or other mental treatment facility and require the conservatee to
accept treatment for the conservatee’s mental disorder, the role of the
attorney is to zealously advocate for that individual in an attempt to
prevent the involuntary detention and involuntary treatment of the client.
Lawyers are charged with protecting their client’s legal rights,248 not
with acquiescing in governmental attempts to deprive their client of
those rights in order to provide unwanted assistance that will, in the
government’s view, benefit the client. As aptly stated by the Montana
Supreme Court in In re Mental Health of K.G.F.:249

247. Michael Perlin has repeatedly urged the use of organized and regularized
counsel for mentally disabled persons in civil commitment hearings and in hearings to
determine a mental patient’s treatment decisionmaking capacity. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN,
supra note 2, § 2B-4, at 214 (“[I]t appears beyond dispute that an organized and
regularized scheme for providing such counsel comes closest to guaranteeing at least
minimally adequate counsel.”). By comparison, Perlin states, “The track record for
‘occasional’ counsel continues to be shoddy.” Id. § 2B-6, at 222. He notes, however, that
although some public defender “programs have traditionally provided effective legal services
to persons with mental disabilities, the track record of others has been, to be charitable,
mixed.” Id. § 2B-5, at 216–17 (footnotes omitted). See also Andalman & Chambers,
supra note 32, at 62 (reporting that the Public Defender in Chicago who represented
mentally disordered persons in civil commitment hearings “did advocate [for] the release
of his clients, though he appeared to press less vigorously for those clients whom he
believed needed hospitalization, even if the client wanted her freedom”).
248. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Christopher A., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433
(Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 764 (Cal. 1969)). See supra text
accompanying note 187.
249. 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
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[W]e must . . . be cautious and critical of signs of paternalism legitimized by the
parens patriae doctrine, where State actors purport to have an absolute
understanding of what is in the best interests of an individual, whose liberty,
dignity and privacy are at issue, and whose voice is muted by the swift and
overriding authority of court-appointed professionals.250

If we truly believe that lawyers today are doing an adequate job in
representing their mentally disordered clients—if we are willing to
accept that belief as our reality—then we are deluding ourselves.251 In
focusing on the question of whether a mental patient had received
effective assistance of counsel in a civil commitment proceeding, the
Montana Supreme Court proclaimed that the involuntary civil commitment
hearing process is an “obvious systemic failure . . . . [T]he ordinary course of
the efficient administration of a legal process threatens to supplant an
individual’s due process rights that serve to safeguard . . . fundamental
liberty interests . . . .”252 The court characterized a civil commitment
hearing as “a proceeding that routinely accepts—and even requires—an
unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains
zealous, adversarial confrontation.”253
The Montana Supreme Court did more than merely indict lawyers who
represent mentally disordered clients in civil commitment proceedings and
judges who condone—and even encourage—ineffective assistance of
counsel in those proceedings. The court adopted specific guidelines for
lawyers to ensure that mentally disordered clients receive effective
assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings.254 For example,
to be eligible for appointment, attorneys are required to “have
specialized course training, or have received supervised on-the-job
training in the duties, skills, and ethics of representing civil commitment

250. Id. at 496.
251. A delusion is defined as “a false, persistent belief not substantiated by sensory
or objective evidence.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE, supra note 6, at 374.
252. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 494.
253. Id. at 492. In describing the existing “perfunctory process” of a civil
commitment hearing, the court acknowledged, “[O]ur legal system of judges, lawyers,
and clinicians has seemingly lost its way in vigilantly protecting the fundamental rights
of [mentally disordered] individuals.” Id. at 493.
254. Id. at 497. The court adopted, and expanded upon, guidelines for legal
representation in civil commitment proceedings developed and promulgated by the
National Center for State Courts. See National Center for State Courts, Guidelines for
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10 A.B.A. MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409,
464–91 (1986) (parts E and F) [hereinafter Guidelines].
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respondents.”255 Counsel for a mentally disordered client is expected to
“conduct a thorough review of all available records”256 and be “prepared
to discuss with his or her client the available options in light of such
investigations.”257 Counsel is required to meet with his or her client and
“[t]he initial client interview should be conducted in private and should
be held sufficiently before any scheduled hearings to permit effective
preparation and prehearing assistance to the client.”258 Counsel is required
“to facilitate the exercise of the client’s right . . . to ‘be examined by a
professional person of the person’s choice.’”259 Most importantly, the
court stated “that the proper role of the attorney is to ‘represent the
perspective of the [client] and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the
[client’s] wishes.’”260 Lest there be any doubt, the court added: “In the
courtroom, an attorney should engage in all aspects of advocacy and
vigorously argue to the best of his or her ability for the ends desired by
the client.”261 If counsel independently advocates for, or acquiesces in
involuntary commitment—absent a voluntary and knowing consent by
the patient—such conduct “will establish the presumption that counsel
was ineffective.”262
The data from the recent study of conservatorship proceedings in San
Diego County support a similar presumption of counsel ineffectiveness
in those proceedings. In 238 cases, counsel for the proposed conservatee
either did not contest the establishment of a conservatorship or stipulated
to the reestablishment of a conservatorship.263 During those same
proceedings, the establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship
was contested in only forty-seven cases. Thus, counsel for the proposed
conservatee either acquiesced in, or independently advocated for, a
conservatorship in 83.5% of the 285 cases.
The data also confirm that the conservatorship hearing process, just as
the civil commitment process in Montana, is an “obvious systemic

255. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 498.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 499 (emphasis omitted).
259. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115(9) (2007) and citing id. § 53-21124(3)).
260. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 500 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 465). If the
client is unwilling or unable to express his or her personal wishes, “the attorney should
advocate the position that best safeguards and advances the client’s interest.” Id.
(quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 465). The Guidelines specifically identify the
client’s interest “in liberty” as the interest that should be safeguarded and advanced by
the attorney. Guidelines, supra note 254, at 466.
261. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 500 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 254, at 483).
262. Id.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 182–212.
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failure”264 “that routinely accepts—and even requires—an unreasonably
low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial
confrontation.”265 Even when counsel for proposed conservatees “contested”
the establishment or reestablishment of a conservatorship, they typically
engaged in no probing cross-examination of the psychiatrist who
testified in favor of the conservatorship and for the imposition of
disabilities being imposed on their client if a conservatorship was
established or reestablished.266 They did not introduce the testimony of
a psychiatrist, a family member, or a friend to counter that of the
psychiatrist who testified in favor of the conservatorship. The only
witness called by counsel for the proposed conservatee was the proposed
conservatee himself or herself.267 Leading a lamb to the slaughter does
not constitute zealous advocacy on behalf of the lamb.268 When trial
judges tolerate—and even encourage—this unreasonably low standard
of legal assistance, they undermine the proposed conservatee’s right to
effective assistance of counsel in the adversarial process that is required
before society deprives a person of liberty and of basic human rights,
including the right to medical self-determination.269
In re Mental Health of K.G.F. was—or should have been—a landmark
decision. However, in the eight years since the case was decided, it has
only been cited on the competency of counsel issue in two appellate
court cases—and both cases cited K.G.F. negatively. In 2004, the Court
of Appeals of Washington disagreed with the Montana Supreme Court’s
refusal to presume the effectiveness of counsel in civil commitment
proceedings, stating: “We do not share the Montana Supreme Court’s
dim view of the quality of civil commitment proceedings . . . in the state
of Washington.”270 In 2006, the Ohio Court of Appeals, citing the

264. Quoting from K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 494.
265. Id. at 492.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 220–21 (reporting on Dr. Haroun’s suggested,
but unused, method of cross-examining psychiatrists who testify that a proposed conservatee
is gravely disabled and that a conservatorship should be established or reestablished).
267. See supra text following note 220.
268. See Isaiah 53:7 (“As a lamb that is led to the slaughter . . . .”).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 159–64 (discussing the requirement of
effective assistance of counsel in conservatorship proceedings). The data from the recent
study of conservatorship proceedings in San Diego County demonstrate that the
performance of counsel for proposed conservatees falls below the objective standard of
reasonably effective assistance of criminal defense counsel established by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
270. In re T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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Washington Court of Appeals decision, declined to follow K.G.F., stating:
“Likewise, we do not share the Supreme Court of Montana’s view . . . .”271
Apparently, in Washington, Ohio, and in most of the United States, a
lawyer who acquiesces in or advocates for the involuntary commitment
of his or her client, or for requiring the client to accept medication that
he or she does not wish to take, or for imposing a conservatorship that
will allow the conservator to “volunteer” the client for placement in a
mental treatment facility and to authorize unwanted treatment, will not
be presumed to be providing ineffective assistance of counsel. The failure
of appellate courts throughout the United States to demand zealous
advocacy by attorneys for their mentally disordered clients suggests that
paternalism does not merely persist, but rather, that paternalism prevails.
Most persons, upon observing The Rocky Horror Picture Show,
consider the highlight of that cult movie classic to be the performance of
“The Time Warp,” a marvelous song and dance number. The lyrics of
that song contain two distinct references to mental disorder: “Madness
takes its toll,” and “[I]t’s the pelvic thrust that really drives you
insane.”272 The lyrics contain one reference to treatment of mental
illness: “You’re spaced out on sensation, like you’re under sedation.”273
And the lyrics contain one reference to the meaningless passage of time:
“Time meant nothing, never would again.”274 Most lawyers, in representing a
mentally disordered client in proceedings to determine whether civil
commitment is warranted, in proceedings to impose treatment over the
client’s objection, and in proceedings to establish a mental health
conservatorship, perform as inadequately as lawyers performed thirty or
forty years ago. Unless lawyers are required to act as zealous advocates
for their clients, they will be guided only by the song’s oft repeated
refrain: “Let’s do the Time Warp again!”275

271. In re L.G., No. 06AP-453, 2006 WL 2780157, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28,
2006). In the only other appellate court decision citing K.G.F., the Supreme Court of
Montana distinguished the case on the question of whether the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the issues were moot. In re R.E.A., 127 P.3d 517, 519
(Mont. 2006).
272. The Time Warp, in THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW (1975), available at
SLL Lyrics, http://www.stlyrics.com/lyrics/therockyhorrorpictureshow/thetimewarp.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. “The Time Warp” is a most appropriate song for this Article. As I wrote in
the introduction to this Article, when I observed the inadequate performance of attorneys
in conservatorship hearings in December of 2007 and the spring of 2008, I felt that I had
entered a time warp—I was transported back to 1975, observing the inadequate
performance of attorneys in conservatorship hearings that I had observed more than thirty
years earlier. The Rocky Picture Horror Show, the movie that contains this song, was first
released in 1975.
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